ABSTRACT

We study a dynamic social choice problem in which an alternative is chosen at each round according to the reported valuations of a set of agents. In the interests of obtaining a solution that is both efficient and fair, we aim to maximize the Nash social welfare, which is the product of all agents’ utilities. We present three novel rules and discuss some of their properties. Two are greedy algorithms and the third attempts to explicitly learn the distribution over inputs, updating its decisions by solving a convex program at each round. We also take a more generally applicable algorithm from existing literature and apply it to our problem. Finally, we compare all four algorithms against the offline optimal solution in simulations.

1. INTRODUCTION

Fairness is a topic of rapidly increasing interest in social choice. On the one hand, there has been much recent interest in the fair allocation of resources—cake cutting [25] as well as other models [14, 22]. On the other hand, in voting, fairness considerations have received attention in selecting a committee of candidates, in the form of a focus on the voters being represented in the committee [10, 20, 8].

A classical approach to obtaining a fair outcome in a context where agents have utility functions is to maximize the Nash social welfare [21], which is the product of the agents’ utilities. One attractive feature of using the Nash social welfare is scale invariance: if an agent doubles all her utilities (or, equivalently, changes the units in which she expresses her utilities), this does not change which outcomes maximize the objective.

In life, it is often difficult to make a completely fair decision in a single-shot context; often, every option will leave some agents unhappy. Fortunately, we can often address this over time—we will go to my most preferred restaurant today, and to yours next week. Achieving fairness over time is the topic of our paper. Ours is certainly not the first work to consider fairness or social choice in dynamic settings; see, for example, [24, 16, 6].

When we make multiple decisions over time, we could simply maximize the Nash welfare in each round separately. But it is easy to see that this can lead to dominated outcomes. For example, suppose there are two agents, and we can choose an alternative that gives one a reward of 3, and the other a reward of 0; or vice versa; or an alternative that gives each of them 1. Within a round, the last alternative maximizes Nash welfare; but if this scenario is repeated every round, then it would be better to alternate between the first two alternatives, so that each agent obtains 1.5 per round on average. Of course, initially, say in the first round, we may not realize we will have these options every round, and so we may choose the last alternative; but if we do have these options every round, we should eventually catch on to this pattern and start alternating. Ideally, we would maximize the long-term Nash welfare, that is, the product of the long-run utilities (which are the sums of each agent’s rewards), rather than, for example, the sum of the products within the rounds. Of course, if there is uncertainty about the options that we will have in future rounds, we cannot expect to get the same Nash welfare that we could obtain with perfect foresight. For example, we may choose to make an agent happy this round, and then later realize that in typical rounds, this agent is very easy to make happy and we should have focused our efforts on an agent that is more difficult to make happy. While such scenarios are inevitable, we do want to adapt and learn over time and thereby approximate the ideal Nash welfare.

In this work, we do not focus primarily on strategic concerns (though we discuss this in more detail in Section 7). Of course it is fairly common to ignore strategic concerns in the social choice literature, but we do think this is an important topic for future work.

On the other hand, there are also important contexts where strategic concerns do not come into play. For example, instead of considering a setting where there are multiple agents that have different utility functions, we can consider a setting where there are multiple objectives that each alternative contributes towards. For example, consider faculty hiring. Suppose the three objectives that we want our faculty hires to contribute to are research, teaching, and service; moreover, suppose that at the time of hiring we can predict well how much each candidate would contribute to each of these objectives, if hired. Then, it stands to reason that, one year, we may hire a top researcher that we do not expect to contribute much to our teaching or service objectives. But we would be loath to make such a decision every year; having hired a few top researchers who are not good at teaching or service, pressure will mount to address needs in the latter two. This fits well into our framework, if we simply treat each of the three objectives as an agent that is “happy” with an alternative to the extent to which it addresses the corresponding objective. In particular, note that the fact that objectives are measured in incomparable units — for example, we might measure research crudely by number of top-tier publications, and teaching crudely by course evaluation scores — poses no problem to our methodology, since this methodology can anyway address agents measuring their utilities in different units. (Since we are not in a setting with a numeraire, there is no reason their utilities should

have similar units.) Thus, a reader who insists on game-theoretic modeling in the case of agents with utility functions may instead substitute this modified interpretation of addressing multiple objectives everywhere in our paper.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce notation and preliminaries. In Section 3 we present two simple greedy algorithms for choosing alternatives, and provide intuitive interpretations of them. We make a computational distinction between them and provide an axiomatic justification for one of them. In Section 4 we present an algorithm which can be seen as an approximation to the optimal solution when \( T \) is infinite. In Section 5 we present an existing algorithm designed for a more general class of stochastic optimization problems with good regret guarantees.

After presenting the algorithms, we evaluate them on simulated data in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss some strategic considerations in the repeated setting, and in Section 8 we discuss specific applications of our methodology, including to voting.

Related work: Parkes and Procaccia [24] examine a similar problem by modeling agents’ evolving preferences with Markov Decision Processes, with a reward function defined over states and actions (alternatives). However, their goal is to maximize the sum of (discounted) rewards and they do not explicitly consider fairness as an objective. Kash, Procaccia and Shah [16] examine a model of dynamic fair division where agents arrive at different points in time and must be allocated resources; however, they do not allow for preferences of agents to change over time as we do. A recent paper by Aleksandrov et al. [6] considers an online fair division problem in a setting where items appear one at a time, and agents declare yes/no preferences over them. In our setting, each round has many alternatives and we allow agents to express more general utilities. Our work is related to the literature on dynamic mechanism design (see, e.g., [23] for an overview), except that we do not consider monetary transfers. Guo, Conitzer and Reeves [15] consider a setting similar to ours, also without money, except that they are not explicitly interested in fairness, only welfare, and focus on incentive compatibility.

2. PRELIMINARIES

Consider a set of \( n \) agents and let \( A \) be a set of \( m \) possible alternatives.\(^1\) At every round \( t = 1, \ldots, T \), agents report their valuation for every alternative. In this paper we allow the valuations to be integers in the range 0 to \( K \) for some finite \( K \) (therefore we can achieve arbitrarily fine granularity by allowing \( K \) to be large). Thus the input at every round is a matrix \( V_t \in \mathbb{Z}_{0 \leq v_i \leq K}^{n \times m} \). For every round \( t \), a Dynamic Social Choice Function (DSCF) chooses a single alternative, corresponding to a column of \( V_t \), which we denote by \( v_t \). Importantly, the problem is online, so we may only use information up to time \( t \) in order to choose \( v_t \).

The valuation of agent \( i \) for the alternative \( j \) at time \( t \) is \( V_t(i, j) \), and at each round we can think of an agent’s valuation vector, \( V_t(i, \cdot) \), as their reported valuation for each alternative. Although the columns of \( V_t \) are formally indexed by alternatives, we will often refer to the vector \( V(\cdot, j) \) simply as \( j \) when there is no risk of confusion. Thus the valuation of agent \( i \) for alternative \( v_t \) will be denoted by \( v_t(i) \). We define a vector of accrued rewards at round \( t \), \( u_t \), where the accrued reward of agent \( i \) at round \( t \) is the sum of agent \( i \)’s valuations for the chosen alternatives up to and including round \( t \), \( u_t(i) = \sum_{s=1}^{t} v_{s}(i) \). We will most often be interested in an agent’s accrued reward before the start of round \( t \), \( u_{t-1}(i) \). The average utility of the agents over the first \( t \) rounds is given by \( v_t^{\text{avg}} = \frac{1}{t} u_t \).

A DSCF is anonymous if applying permutation \( \sigma \) to the rows of \( V_t \), for all \( t \), does not change the chosen alternative \( v_t \), for any \( t \). A DSCF is neutral if applying permutation \( \sigma \) to the columns of \( V_t \), for all \( t \), results in choosing alternative \( \sigma(v_t) \) for all \( t \). For the rest of this paper we only consider anonymous, neutral DSCFs.

The DSCFs that we discuss are presented in a way that naturally allows ties between alternatives. We think of the mechanisms choosing a set of possible alternatives, and then choosing a single alternative from the set arbitrarily.

The Nash social welfare (NSW) of utility vector \( v \), \( \text{NSW}(v) \), is defined to be the product of the agents’ utilities,

\[
\text{NSW}(v) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} v(i).
\]

The NSW is frequently used as an objective in the fair division literature as it strikes a balance between maximizing efficiency and fairness (for recent examples in the computer science literature, see [11, 13, 26]). One further nice property of NSW is that it is scale-free, meaning that the optimal choice of alternative is unchanged if some agent(s) report valuations on different scales from others.

Our aim is to maximize the NSW of the average utility across all \( T \) rounds, \( \text{NSW}(v^{\text{avg}}) \). Some of our algorithms involve the use of convex programming, which requires a concave objective function to maximize. Unfortunately, \( \text{NSW} \) is not a concave function, however \( \ln(\text{NSW}) \) is. Thus, we will interchangeably talk about maximizing

\[
\ln(\text{NSW}(v^{\text{avg}})) = \ln \left( \prod_{i=1}^{n} v_{t}^{\text{avg}}(i) \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \ln(v_t^{\text{avg}}(i)).
\]

Since \( \ln \) is an increasing function, the solution maximizing \( \ln(\text{NSW}(v)) \) is the same as the solution maximizing \( \text{NSW}(v) \).

The benchmark algorithm is the optimal offline algorithm, where an offline instance of the problem is given by the set of matrices \( \{V_t\}_{t \in \{1, \ldots, T\}} \). The offline problem can be solved via the following mixed integer convex program:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Maximize} & \sum_{i=1}^{n} \ln \left( \sum_{j=1}^{m} x_{t,j} V_t(i, j) \right) \\
\text{subject to} & \sum_{j=1}^{m} x_{t,j} = 1 \quad \forall t, \quad x_{t,j} \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall t, j
\end{align*}
\]

where \( x_{t,j} \) is a binary variable denoting whether or not alternative \( j \) is chosen at time \( t \). The constraint simply says that for each \( t \), we must choose exactly one alternative. We denote the optimal value achieved by convex program 2 by OPT (thus the optimal Nash social welfare is \( e^{\text{OPT}} \)).

3. GREEDY ALGORITHMS

In this section we present two simple greedy algorithms. The first algorithm, \( \text{GREEDY} \), simply chooses \( v_t \) to maximize \( \text{NSW}(v^{\text{avg}}) \). The other, \( \text{LINEARGREEDY} \), is a linear version of \( \text{GREEDY} \) which assigns each agent a weight \( w_t \) equal to the inverse of their accrued utility at the start of each round and simply chooses \( v_t = \arg\max_{v \in V_t} w \cdot v \). The advantage of these algorithms lies in their simplicity to understand and execute.
One challenge that these algorithms face is that in the early rounds it may not be possible to give all agents non-zero utility. Therefore it may be the case that \( u(v_t^{\text{non-zero}}) = 0 \) for all choices of \( v_t \), even when one allocation is clearly better than all others. We address this by allocating some small ‘hallucinated’ utility to those agents with zero accrued reward (not necessarily the same to each agent), which is removed once the agent accrues some positive reward. The algorithms are shown as Algorithms 1 and 2. For Algorithm 1, let the parameter \( x \) be such that \( 0 < x < \frac{1}{2^{n(K+1)^{n+1}}} \).

**Algorithm 1 GREEDY**

1. for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) do
2. \( \text{Set } x \leq \epsilon_i \leq 2(K+1)^{n-1}x \)
3. end for
4. Initialize \( u_0 = (0, \ldots, 0) \)
5. for \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) do
6. \( \text{Choose } v_t \in \arg\max_{v \in V} \prod_{i=1}^{n} (\max\{u_{t-1}(i) + v(i), \epsilon_i\}) \)
7. \( u_t = u_{t-1} + v_t \)
8. end for

**Algorithm 2 LINEARGREEDY**

1. for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) do
2. \( \text{Set } 0 < \delta_i < \frac{1}{nK} \)
3. end for
4. Initialize \( u_0 = (0, \ldots, 0) \)
5. for \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) do
6. \( \text{Set } w_i = \max(1, u_{t-1}(i)) \text{ for all } i \)
7. Choose \( v_t \in \arg\max_{v \in V} w \cdot v \)
8. \( u_t = u_{t-1} + v_t \)
9. end for

We first state a lemma which follows easily from the choice of \( \epsilon_i \).

**Lemma 3.1.** For all \( j, k \) such that \( 1 \leq k < k + j \leq n \), and all sets of agents \( I \text{ and } I' \), of size \( k + j \) and \( k \) respectively,

\[
(K+1)^{n-k-j} \prod_{i \in I} \epsilon_i < \prod_{i \in I'} \epsilon_i.
\]

**Proof.** Let \( 1 \leq k < k + j \leq n \). Let \( I = \{i_1, \ldots, i_{k+j}\} \) and \( I' = \{i'_1, \ldots, i'_k\} \). Recall that \( 0 < x < \frac{1}{2^{n(K+1)^{n+1}}} \) and \( x \leq \epsilon_i \leq 2(K+1)^{n-1}x \) for all \( i \). Then

\[
(K+1)^{n-k-j} \prod_{i \in I} \epsilon_i \leq (K+1)^{n-k-j}(2(K+1)^{n-1}x)^{k+j} < x^k (K+1)^{n-k-j}(2(K+1)^{n-1}x)^{k+j} \]

\[
= x^k \left( \frac{1}{2^{n(K+1)^{n+1}}} \right)^j \leq x \cdot \frac{2^n (K+1)^{(k+j)}(n-2k-2j)}{(2^n (K+1)^{(n+1)})^j} \leq x \cdot \frac{2^n (K+1)^{(k+j)}(n-2k-2j)}{2^n (K+1)^{(n+1)}} < x^k \left( \frac{K+1}{(K+1)^{(k+j+1)}} \right)^{n+1} \leq x^k \leq \prod_{i' \in I'} \epsilon_i.
\]

We next state a simple interpretation of GREEDY. Let \( NSW^+(v) \) be the product of all non-zero entries in \( v \).

**Proposition 3.2.** At every round, GREEDY selects an alternative to maximize the number of agents with \( u_t(i) > 0 \). Subject to this condition, and holding fixed the set of agents with non-zero utility, GREEDY chooses an alternative which maximizes \( NSW^+(v_t^{\text{non-zero}}) \).

**Proof.** Consider the action of GREEDY at round \( t \). Suppose first that all agents have \( u_{t-1}(i) > 0 \). Then the first condition in the proposition statement is vacuous; all choices maximize the number of agents with \( u_t(i) > 0 \). Since \( \epsilon_i < 1 \) for all \( i \), the choice at Line 6 is precisely to maximize \( NSW^+(v_t^{\text{non-zero}}) = NSW^+(v_t') \).

Now suppose that \( u_{t-1}(i) = 0 \) for some agent \( i \), and consider two alternatives \( v' \) and \( v \). Suppose that \( |I'| = \{i : u_{t-1}(i) + v'(i) = 0\} = k \) and \( |I| = \{i : u_{t-1}(i) + v(i) = 0\} = k + j > k \). To show that GREEDY maximizes the number of agents with \( u_t(i) > 0 \), it suffices to show that the product in Line 6 is larger when \( v' \) is chosen than when \( v \) is chosen.

We consider the case in which the product in Line 6 is greatest for \( v' \) compared to \( v \). In particular, all \( n-k \) agents with \( u_{t-1}(i) + v'(i) > 0 \) have \( u_{t-1}(i) + v'(i) = 1 \), and all \( n-k-j \) agents with \( u_{t-1}(i) + v(i) > 0 \) have \( u_{t-1}(i) + v(i) = K + 1 \) if \( u_{t-1}(i) + v(i) > K + 1 \) then \( u_{t-1}(i) + v(i) > u_{t-1}(i) \), since no single-round valuation is greater than \( K \). Then the product on Line 6 for \( v' \) is \( \prod_{i \in I'} G_i \), and for \( v \) is \( (K+1)^{n-k-j} \prod_{i \in I} G_i \). By Lemma 3.1, the former is greater than the latter, and GREEDY chooses \( v' \), thus minimizing the number of agents with \( u_t(i) = 0 \).

Finally, suppose that GREEDY chooses \( v_t \) when there exists another alternative \( v \) which results in the same set of agents with \( u_t(i) > 0 \) (call this set of agents \( I \)), and \( NSW^+(u_{t-1} + v_t) < NSW^+(u_{t-1} + v) \). Then, by definition of \( NSW^+ \),

\[
\prod_{i \in I} (u_{t-1}(i) + v_t(i)) > \prod_{i \in I} (u_{t-1}(i) + v(i)) \]

\[
\Leftrightarrow \prod_{i \in I} (u_{t-1}(i) + v_t(i)) \prod_{i \in I} \epsilon_i < \prod_{i \in I} (u_{t-1}(i) + v(i)) \prod_{i \in I} \epsilon_i \]

\[
\Leftrightarrow \prod_{i=1}^{n} \max\{(u_{t-1}(i) + v_t(i), \epsilon_i) \} < \prod_{i=1}^{n} \max\{(u_{t-1}(i) + v(i), \epsilon_i) \},
\]

which contradicts the choice of \( v_t \).

Indeed, we can show that every alternative not ruled out by Theorem 3.2 can be chosen by GREEDY, for some choice of \( \{\epsilon_i\} \).

**Theorem 3.3.** Suppose alternative \( a \) maximizes the number of agents with \( u_t(i) > 0 \). Suppose further that for all \( j \) such that choosing \( j \) results in the same set of agents with non-zero accrued reward, \( NSW^+(u_{t-1} + V_t(\cdot, j)) \leq NSW^+(u_{t-1} + V_t(\cdot, a)) \). Then \( a \) is chosen by GREEDY for some choice of \( \{\epsilon_i\} \).

**Proof.** Let \( a \in V_t \) satisfy the conditions of the theorem statement. We exhibit a set of \( \{\epsilon_i\} \) such that \( a \) is chosen by GREEDY. Let \( I \) be the set of agents with non-zero accrued reward after choosing \( a \). Then let \( \epsilon_i = x \) (the same \( x \) as in Line 2 of Algorithm 1) for all \( i \in I \), and \( \epsilon_i' = 2(K+1)^{n-1}x \) for all \( i' \not\in I \). Consider some alternative \( j \) that also maximizes the number of agents with non-zero accrued reward (since otherwise, by Proposition 3.2, it would certainly not be chosen by GREEDY), and denote by \( J \) the set of agents given non-zero accrued utility after choosing \( j \).

Suppose that \( J \not\subset I \). By assumption, \( |J| = |I| \). Therefore \( |J \setminus I| = |J| \). Let us consider the contribution of all agents to the
product in Line 6 of Algorithm 1 for alternatives \( j \) and \( a \). There are four types of agent to consider:

1. An agent \( i \in I \setminus J \). These are agents for which \( u_{t-1}(i) = 0 \), with \( V(i, a) \geq 1 \) and \( V(i, j) = 0 \). Therefore each of these agents contributes a factor of at least 1 to the product for \( a \) and \( \epsilon_i = x \) to the product for \( j \).
2. An agent \( i \in I \cap J \). These are agents for which the choice of either \( a \) or \( j \) both result for \( u(i) > 0 \). In the worst case for \( a \) (relative to \( j \)), \( u_{t-1}(i) = 1 \) with \( V(i, a) = 0 \) and \( V(i, j) = K \). That is, each of these agents contributes a factor of at least 1 to the product for \( a \) and at most \( K + 1 \) to the product for \( j \).
3. An agent \( i \in J \setminus I \). These are agents for which \( u_{t-1}(i) = 0 \), with \( V(i, a) = 0 \) and \( V(i, j) \geq 1 \). Each of these agents contributes a factor of \( \epsilon_i = 2(K+1)^{n-1}x \) to the product for \( a \) and at most \( K + 1 \) to the product for \( j \).
4. An agent \( i \notin I \cup J \). These are agents for which the choice of either \( a \) or \( j \) both result in \( u(i) = 0 \). Thus they contribute exactly the same factor to the product for both \( a \) and \( j \).

Let us write down the product from Line 6 for \( a \) (not counting the agents of type 4 which make the same contribution to both). It is at least:

\[
(2(K+1)^{n-1}x)^{|J\setminus I|} = (2(K+1)^{n-1}x)^{|I\setminus J|} \tag{3}
\]

The product for \( j \) (not counting the agents of type 4 which make the same contribution to both) is at most:

\[
x^{|J\setminus I|} \cdot (K+1)^{|I\cap J|} \cdot K^{|I\setminus J|} \leq x^{|I\setminus J|} \cdot (K+1)^{|I\cap J|} \cdot (K+1)^{|I\setminus J|} = x^{|I\setminus J|} \cdot (K+1)^{|I\setminus J|} \cdot (K+1)^{|I\setminus J|} \tag{4}
\]

Noting that \(|I \cap J| + |I \setminus J| \leq n – 1 \) (since \(|I \cap J| + 2|I \setminus J| \leq n \) and \( I \setminus J \) is nonempty), it is clear that expression 3 is greater than expression 4. Therefore the product in Line 6 is higher for \( a \) than for \( j \).

Finally, suppose that \( J = I \). Then, by the condition of the theorem, \( NSW^+(u_{t-1} + j) \leq NSW^+(u_{t-1} + a) \), which implies that choosing \( a \) results in a weakly higher product in Line 6 than choosing \( j \).

Therefore \( a \) is chosen if GREEDY, since all other alternatives which maximize the number of agents with non-zero accrued reward after round \( t \) have been ruled out, given our particular choice of \( \epsilon \).

Unlike GREEDY, LINEARGREEDY may leave some agents with zero utility even when it was possible to give positive utility to all agents.

**Example 3.4.** Let \( n = 2, m = 3 \), and suppose that \( V_1 = (3, 0, 1) \). The columns represent alternatives \( a_1, a_2, \) and \( a_3 \), respectively, and the rows represent agents \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \) respectively.

For any choice of \( 0 < \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2 < 1 \), GREEDY chooses \( a_3 \) since \( 3\epsilon_1 < 1 \). However, LINEARGREEDY assigns the weights \( w_1, w_2 \) and chooses \( \arg\max_{e \in \{a_1, a_2, a_3\}} w \cdot v \). Since it must be the case that either \( 3w_1 > w_1 + w_2 \) or that \( 3w_2 > w_1 + w_2 \), it is not possible for \( a_3 \) to be chosen by LINEARGREEDY even though it is the only alternative which gives both agents positive utility.

We can, however, provide a weaker guarantee for LINEARGREEDY.

**Proposition 3.5.** LINEARGREEDY always chooses an alternative \( v_j \) with \( v_j(i) > 0 \) for at least one agent \( i \) with \( u_{t-1}(i) = 0 \), if such an alternative exists.

**Proof.** Let \( i \) be an agent with \( u_{t-1}(i) = 0 \) and \( v \) be an alternative with \( v(i) \geq 1 \). Then the weight assigned to \( i \) at round \( t \) by LINEARGREEDY is \( w_t = \frac{\epsilon_i}{v(i)} \geq nK \). Suppose for contradiction that LINEARGREEDY chooses an alternative \( v' \) such that \( v'(i) > 0 \) only for agents with \( u_{t-1}(i) > 0 \). The weight of each such agent is \( \frac{1}{\epsilon_i} \leq \frac{1}{v(i)} \leq K \), thus the dot product in Line 7 is at most \((n - 1)K < nK \). Thus \( v' \) is not chosen by LINEARGREEDY.

**3.1 Computational Considerations**

Clearly, when the number of allocations, \( m \), is not too large, the outcome of both GREEDY and LINEARGREEDY can be computed efficiently. However, consider a setting in which every round is a combinatorial allocation problem, so the number of alternatives is exponential in the number of items being allocated. For instance, if every round is an allocation of food bank items [6] to different charities then we will have substitutes and complements which must be taken into account, thus charities have preferences over subsets of items, not just items themselves. In this setting, computing the chosen alternative under GREEDY is weakly NP-hard even in a very restricted case.

**Proposition 3.6.** Computing the chosen alternative \( v_j \) under GREEDY is weakly NP-hard, even when there are only two agents and each has additive valuations over the items.

**Proof.** Suppose there are two agents with the same valuation over the items in the first round. Then the allocation under GREEDY is to allocate each agent an equal share of the items according to their common valuation (or as close to equal as possible). This is exactly an instance of PARTITION, which is weakly NP-hard.

Note that for the LINEARGREEDY algorithm, computing the chosen alternative is equivalent to the combinatorial auction winner determination (CAWD) problem, which has been studied extensively [27, 7, 18]. Thus, the outcome under LINEARGREEDY can be computed efficiently under exactly the same conditions as the CAWD problem. Even in those cases where LINEARGREEDY can not be computed efficiently, we can use any existing algorithm for the CAWD problem.

**3.2 Axiomatization of LINEARGREEDY**

It is possible to simply consider LINEARGREEDY an approximation to GREEDY. However, in this section we provide an axiomatization of the LINEARGREEDY mechanism which provides some justification for seeing it as a worthwhile rule in and of itself, without needing to appeal to its approximation of GREEDY.

A DSCF is scale-free if it is not affected by a uniform (multiplicative) scaling of some agent’s valuations. This property is desirable because it means we do not require any sort of agreement or synchronization as to the units of measurement used by the agents in their reporting.

**Definition 3.7.** Let \( c > 0 \). Say that a DSCF satisfies scale-free-ness (SF) if the chosen alternative at round \( t \) is still among the set of (possible) chosen alternatives if we replace \( v(i) \) by \( c \cdot v(i) \) for all \( v \in V_t \) for every \( t = 1, \ldots, T \).

For example, when agents have preferences over bundles of size at most 2, the problem is in P.
LEMMA 3.8. **LINEARGREEDY satisfies SF.**

Proof. Suppose that agent \( i \) scales all their valuations by \( c > 0 \). We show by induction that there exists some choice of \( \delta \) such that **LINEARGREEDY** still chooses the same alternative at each round as it did before the scaling.

Consider the first round, \( t = 1 \). Let \( \delta' \) denote the vector of hallucinated utilities chosen before the scaling. When \( i \) scales their valuations by factor \( c \), simply set \( \delta_i = c \cdot \delta'_i \) and \( \delta_{ij} = \delta'_{ij} \) for all \( j \neq i \). Thus the weight of \( i \) is scaled by \( \frac{1}{c} \), so the value of \( w \cdot v \) is unchanged for all \( v \in V_i \), and the same alternative is chosen at round 1.

Now consider round \( t > 1 \), and suppose that the same alternatives are chosen for all rounds before \( t \). In particular, the accrued utility of all agents \( i' \neq i \) (or, in the case that \( i' \) has zero accrued utility, then the value of \( \delta_i \)) is the same as before the scaling, so their weights have not changed. But the accrued utility of \( i \) has scaled by a factor of \( c \), since \( i' \)’s valuation for every alternative at every round is scaled by \( c \) (and, in the case that \( i \) has zero accrued utility, we still have that \( \delta_i = c \cdot \delta'_i \)), so that the weight of \( i \) is scaled by \( \frac{1}{c} \). Thus, again, \( w \cdot v \) is unchanged for all \( v \in V_i \) and the same alternative is chosen.

Finally we need to rule out the possibility of there being some setting of \( \delta \) such that some new alternative, \( a \), is chosen at round \( t \) as a result of the scaling that was not previously chosen. But if this were the case, then we can just scale the scaled instance by \( \frac{1}{c} \) and return to the original instance where, by the above proof, there is some value of \( \delta \) such that \( a \) is chosen at round \( t \).

A DSCF is separable into single-minded agents if the chosen alternative at a given round is unchanged by replacing an agent by several new agents with the same accrued utility, each of which has unit positive valuation for only one alternative.

DEFINITION 3.9. Say that a DSCF is separable into single-minded agents (SSMA) if, at round \( t \), the same allocation is chosen if we replace each agent with several new agents according to the following scheme: An agent with valuation vector \( V_i(i, \cdot) \) is, for each \( j \in \{1, \ldots, m\} \), replaced by \( V_i(i, j) \) new agents, each with valuation vector \( e_j \). Each new agent has the same (possibly hallucinated) accrued utility as the original agent it replaces.

LEMMA 3.10. **LINEARGREEDY satisfies SSMA.**

Proof. Consider round \( t \) with valuation matrix \( V_t \). **LINEARGREEDY** chooses

\[
\arg\max_{j \in V_t} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{V_t(i, j) - 1}{u_{t-1}(i)} \right)
\]

Now suppose that we replace the agents with new agents according to the definition of SSMA. For every agent \( i \) and alternative \( j \), we now have \( V_t(i, j) \) agents with accrued utility \( u_{t-1}(i) \) and valuation vector \( e_j \). The accrued utility, and therefore the weight of each of these agents in the **LINEARGREEDY** algorithm, is the same as the agent it replaced. Thus the value of the dot product on Line 7 for an alternative \( j \) is

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{V_t(i, j) - 1}{u_{t-1}(i)} \right)
\]

and **LINEARGREEDY** chooses the same alternative in each case.

The plurality axiom says that if all agent valuation vectors are unit vectors, and we have no reason to distinguish between agents, then the allocation favored by the most agents should be chosen.

DEFINITION 3.11. Say that an allocation satisfies plurality (P) if, when all agents have preferences of the form \( e_j \), and all agents have the same (non-zero) accrued utility, then the chosen alternative is the one with non-zero valuation from the most agents.

The axiom says nothing about the case when all agents have zero accrued utility. The idea of the axiom is that we should choose the alternative which provides the greatest utility gain, relative to what agents already have. However, in the case that agents have zero accrued utility, it is not possible to make accurate comparisons as to the relative benefit each agent receives.

**Observation 3.12.** **LINEARGREEDY** satisfies plurality.

We now show that any mechanism that achieves SF, SSMA, and P simultaneously must agree with **LINEARGREEDY**, provided that all accrued rewards are non-zero.

**Theorem 3.13.** Suppose that \( u_{t-1}(i) > 0 \) for all \( i \). Denote by \( J_t \) the set of all alternatives that may be chosen by **LINEARGREEDY** at time \( t \). If a DSCF satisfies SF, SSMA, and P then it must choose some alternative from \( J_t \) at time \( t \).

Proof. We have already shown that **LINEARGREEDY** satisfies SF, SSMA, and P. Suppose that all agents have \( u_{t-1}(i) > 0 \). Let \( M \) be a DSCF that satisfies all three axioms simultaneously. We show that \( M \)’s choice of alternative is the same as one chosen by **LINEARGREEDY**.

Without loss of generality, let \( u_{t-1}(i) = u \) for all agents \( i \). We may assume this because, by SF, \( M \) would choose the same allocation at round \( t \) (and all previous rounds) even if the valuation vectors of some agent(s) were multiplied by a constant across all rounds. So, if \( u_{t-1}(i) = u_{t-1}(j) \), we can transform the instance to one in which all agents have the same accrued reward by multiplying agent \( i \)’s valuations by \( \prod_{j \neq i} u_{t-1}(j) \) for all \( i \). Then all agents have the same accrued utility, \( \prod_{j \neq i} u_{t-1}(i) \).

By SSMA, we can replace the agents with \( \sum_{j=1}^{m} V_i(i, j) \) agents, such that \( V_i(i, j) \) of them have valuation vector \( e_j \) for all \( j \in \{1, \ldots, m\} \), all with accrued reward \( u \). Then, by plurality, the chosen allocation is

\[
\arg\max_{j \in V_t} \sum_{i=1}^{n} V_t(i, j).
\]

But note that **LINEARGREEDY** assigns equal weight \( w_i \) to each agent since \( u_{t-1}(i) = u_{t-1}(j) \) for all \( i, j \). Thus **LINEARGREEDY** chooses precisely the alternatives which maximize Equation 5.

4. DISTRIBUTIONAL UPDATE ALGORITHM

So far we have assumed nothing about the way that the input matrices are drawn. In this section, we will assume that there is some distribution, \( D \), over \( \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^{n \times m} \) from which matrices are drawn i.i.d at each round.

Suppose first that we know \( D \), and that \( T = \infty \). Then the optimal solution is defined by a policy: when \( V_t = v \), choose allocation \( j \) with probability \( x_{vj} \). We simply need to choose values for \( \{x_{vj}\} \).

In practice, this algorithm may be suitable when we believe the distribution of inputs to be somewhat stable over time.
in order to maximize $\mathbb{E}(NSW(v_t^{\text{opt}}))$, as $t \to \infty$. We can compute these variables by the following convex program:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \sum_{i=1}^{n} \log \sum_{v \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}_{\geq 0}} \sum_{j=1}^{m} Pr(V_t = v)x_{vji}v(i, j) \\
\text{subject to} & \sum_{j \in A} x_{vji} = 1 \quad \forall v \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}_{\geq 0}, \quad x_{vji} \geq 0 \quad \forall v, j
\end{align*}$$

Theorem 4.1. The variables $x_{vji}$ computed by convex program 6 define the optimal policy when the distribution $D$ is known and $T = \infty$.

Proof Sketch. Let $\{x_{vji}\}$ be the optimal solution to convex program 6. We show that $\{x_{vji}\}$ converges to the optimal solution for the offline problem in the case that $T \to \infty$. So consider an offline instance for some large $T$, large enough that every matrix $v$ that occurs with non-zero probability in $D$ appears a large number of times in the input. For every round that $V_t = v$, choose an alternative by sampling from the distribution $x_{vji}$. Denote the objective value achieved by $S_D$. Now consider the observed distribution in the finite instance, $O$. Consider solving convex program 6 for distribution $O$, giving variables $x_{vji}'$, and denote the value of the resulting solution on the large instance, $S_O$. It can be shown that $S_O \to S_D$ as $O \to D$. By the law of large numbers, $\lim_{T \to \infty} O = D$, therefore $\lim_{T \to \infty} S_O = S_D$.

Now consider the optimal offline solution as defined by mixed integer program 2. Denote the value it achieves by $S_{MIP}$. Clearly $S_{MIP} \geq S_O$, since $S_{MIP}$ is optimal. Next, consider the alternative choices in the offline solution and use them to define variables

$$x_{vji}' = \#\text{times}(V_t = v \text{ and } j \text{ is chosen})/\#\text{times}(V_t = v).$$

Denote the value of the solution defined by the $x_{vji}'$ variables by $S'$. $S' = S_{MIP}$ since sampling from the solution corresponding to $S'$ gives the solution corresponding to $S_{MIP}$.

Lastly, we show that $\lim_{T \to \infty} S' \leq \lim_{T \to \infty} S_O$. Note that the variables $x_{vji}'$ are a feasible solution to convex program 6. Therefore, as long as the instance is large enough that the probabilities $x_{vji}'$ can be well-sampled for every $v$ that appears in the instance, $S_O$ is the highest value that can be achieved. As $T \to \infty$, we can sample these variables arbitrarily well. Thus, $\lim_{T \to \infty} S' \leq \lim_{T \to \infty} S_O$.

So, in the limit as $t \to \infty$, we have the relations

$$S_{MIP} = S' \leq S_O = S_D \leq S_{MIP}.$$  

Here the inequalities are forced to be equalities, otherwise we get $S_{MIP} < S_{MIP}$. In particular, $\lim_{T \to \infty} S_D = S_{MIP}$.  

Let us now relax the assumption that $D$ is known to the algorithm. In this case, one approach would be to approximately learn the distribution by sampling, then compute the optimal policy according to the learned distribution, and act accordingly for the remaining rounds. We can even continue to update our belief on the distribution as often as we want, re-compute the variables $\{x_{vji}\}$, and choose according to them until we perform another update step. If $T = \infty$, we can learn the distribution arbitrarily well, and behave close to optimally in the long term.

The algorithm we present now uses the same heuristic even when $T$ is finite. We begin with no knowledge of $D$, but update our belief with every new piece of information $V_t$, and use the inferred distribution to compute a policy $\{x_{vji}\}$.

Cruially, the update to $p_s$ is done before $v_t$ is actually chosen according to $x_{vji}$. Were this not the case, the algorithm would not be defined when valuation matrix $s$ appears for the first time.

Algorithm 3 Update

1. for $t = 1, \ldots, T$ do
2.  for $s \in \{V_1, V_2, \ldots, V_t\}$ do
3.    Let $p_s = (\text{number of times } s \text{ has been realized})/t$
4.  end for
5. end for
6. Randomly draw $v_t$ according to $x_{V_t,j}$

Example 4.2. Let $n = m = 2$. Suppose that $V_1 = (\frac{1}{2}, 0)$, where the columns represent alternatives $a_1$ and $a_2$ respectively. Then the algorithm updates its belief on $D$ to be that $V_1$ appears with probability 1, in which case the optimal policy is to choose $a_1$ and $a_2$ with probability 0.5 each. Suppose it randomly chooses $a_1$. Suppose that $V_2 = (\frac{3}{4}, 0)$. Then the algorithm updates its belief on $D$ to be 0.5$V_1 + 0.5V_2$. Given this distribution, the optimal policy is to choose $a_1$ when $V_2$ is realized and $a_2$ when $V_1$ is realized.

Thus, the algorithm chooses $v_2 = a_1$. Now suppose that $V_3 = V_2$. Then the updated belief on $D$ is $\frac{1}{4}V_1 + \frac{3}{4}V_2$. The optimal policy now is to choose $a_2$ whenever $V_1$ is realized, and whenever $V_2$ is realized to draw randomly from $\frac{1}{2}a_1 + \frac{1}{2}a_2$. Thus, the algorithm draws an allocation for $v_3$ from this distribution.

Observe that, in Example 4.2, from the perspective of the algorithm at $t = 3$, a mistake was made at round 1 by choosing $a_1$ instead of $a_2$. As stated, this algorithm does nothing to take the mistake into account. However, one could imagine incorporating a more ‘backwards-looking’ approach into this algorithm. As a simple example we could, with probability $p$, simply use Greedy at round $t$, which would act to partially compensate for past mistakes.

In Example 4.2, Greedy would choose $a_2$ to make up for agent 2 not accruing any utility from the first two rounds.

5. STOCHASTIC CONVEX PROGRAMMING APPROACH

A recent paper by Agrawal and Devanur [5] designed algorithms for a general class of problems that encompasses our framework. In their setting, the input is a concave function over a bounded domain $R$, a convex set $S \subseteq R$, and the goal is to choose a vector $v_t$ at each round so that $f(v_t^{\text{opt}})$ is maximized, subject to $v_t^{\text{opt}} \in S$. For the setting in our paper, however, there is no constraint, since all input vectors are feasible. That is, $S = R$.

They provide an algorithm using tools from convex optimization which, in our setting, reduces to Algorithm 4. The algorithm assigns a vector of weights, $\phi$, to the agents and minimizes the weighted sum of valuations at each round (weights can be negative). Every round, $\phi$ is updated by an online convex optimization update (the implementation we present uses the gradient descent algorithm to update $\phi$).

The initialized variables $\phi$ and $\eta$ can be set to any values satisfying the constraints. In our implementation, we set $\phi = -1$ and $\eta = 0.5$ after some experimentation.

Agrawal and Devanur prove a regret bound on Algorithm 4 of $O\left(\sqrt{\frac{m \log(m)}{T}}\right)$. This is a bound on the expected regret when the input matrices appear in a random order. It is not a guarantee on any single instance. Therefore, while we would expect good performance from this algorithm on random instances, we may not necessarily expect low regret on instances where the agents’ preferences change over time in a structured way. We explore this further in Section 6.
Algorithm 4 STOCHASTIC

1: Initialize $\phi \in \mathbb{R}^n, \|\phi\|_2 \leq \sqrt{n}, \eta > 0.$
2: for $t = 1, \ldots, T$ do
3: Choose $v_t = \arg\min_{v \in V_t} j \cdot \phi_t$
4: if $\phi_t(i) > \frac{1}{K+1}$ then
5: Set $\phi_{t+1}(i) = \phi_t(i) - \eta(v_t(i) - K - 1)$
6: else if $\phi_t(i) < -1$ then
7: Set $\phi_{t+1}(i) = \phi_t(i) - \eta(v_t(i) - 1)$
8: else
9: Set $\phi_{t+1} = \frac{\sqrt{\eta}}{\|v_t + 1\|_2} \phi_{t+1}$
10: end if
11: if $\|\phi_{t+1}\|_2 > \sqrt{n}$ then
12: Set $\phi_{t+1} = \frac{\sqrt{n}}{\|v_t + 1\|_2} \phi_{t+1}$
13: end if
14: end for

The regret guarantees provided by Algorithm 4 require that the concave function is Lipschitz continuous on the bounded domain $R$. Unfortunately, our function, log $NSW(t)$, is not Lipschitz continuous at 0, which we fix by shifting the agents’ valuations to lie in the range $\{1, \ldots, K+1\}$. After solving, we then shift the valuations back before computing the value of the solution found. When $K$ is large, this shift is not too significant. If $K$ was small, we could shift the values by something less than 1. However, the Lipschitz constant increases as we allow inputs closer to 0, and this constant appears as a linear factor in the regret bound.

6. EXPERIMENTS

6.1 Simulated Data

We compare the four algorithms discussed in this paper – GREEDY, LINEARGREEDY, STOCHASTIC, and UPDATE– on input data randomly generated from a variety of distributions. As a benchmark we also compute the optimal offline solution for each input using MIP (2).

We consider three input models. The first, uniform, has each $V_t(i, j)$ chosen uniformly at random between 0 and 20. The second, half-half, draws $V_t$ from a different distribution depending on $t$. For $t < \frac{T}{2}$, $V_t = \left(\begin{array}{cc}A & B \\ C & D\end{array}\right)$, where $A, B, C, D$ are submatrices of size $\frac{T}{2} \times \frac{T}{2}$. Entries in $A$ are integers in the range 0 to 25 drawn uniformly at random, entries in $B$ and $C$ are in the range 0 to 5, and entries in $D$ are in the range 0 to 10. For $t \geq \frac{T}{2}$, submatrices $A, B, C, D$ are drawn in the same way but $V_t = \left(\begin{array}{cc}B & C \\ A & D\end{array}\right)$. The third model, alternating, sets $V_t = \left(\begin{array}{cc}A & B \\ C & D\end{array}\right)$ for odd $t$ and $V_t = \left(\begin{array}{cc}C & B \\ A & D\end{array}\right)$ for even $t$. In both of these latter models, it is almost always optimal to choose an alternative for which half of the valuations are being drawn from the high, ‘A’, distribution. The other agents can be compensated in a round where they draw from the ‘A’ distribution.

For every fixed value of $n, m, T$, and input model that we report, values are averaged over 15 random instances. When not explicitly varied, $n = 20, m = 10$, and $T = 40$.

Consider first the runtime comparisons in Figure 1. These simulations are performed on inputs drawn from the half-half model, varying values of $n, m, T$ separately. Three of the algorithms, GREEDY, LINEARGREEDY, and STOCHASTIC, take virtually no time to run on the instances we consider. This is not surprising as each makes only a simple comparison between each of the $m$ alternatives, followed by some very simple arithmetic operations to update weights and accrued utility. The UPDATE algorithm is the slowest by far on our simulations, even slower than the MIP for solving the offline problem (although we would expect that for large values of $T$, the MIP would become slower than UPDATE).

We could speed it up by a constant factor of $k$ by only updating the inferred distribution, and values of $v_t(i, j)$, every $k$ rounds, and still expect reasonable results. All of our algorithms scale well with $n$ and $m$. Runtime results for the other two input models are very similar and we do not present them here.

Turning to the value comparisons in Figure 2, we see that the input model used heavily influences the performance of the algorithms. In these graphs, OPT is normalized to 1, and for each input model we present results only for varying $T$. The results for varying $m$ and $n$ look very similar.

For the uniform input model, all algorithms perform well, achieving at least 75% of the optimal value. This model provides a relatively simple case for the algorithms; indeed, simply maximizing (additive) welfare at each round is the optimal solution in the limit as $T$ grows. For the half-half distribution, STOCHASTIC is clearly better than all the other algorithms, achieving around 60-70% of OPT compared to less than 30% for the others. This is because the weight vector, $\phi_t$, can change quite significantly in the space of just one round. Thus it is not over-burdened by rounds in the past and is able to quickly adapt when the input distribution changes. In fact, in all instances that we examined closely, STOCHASTIC chooses a ‘good’ alternative for the first $\frac{T}{2}$ rounds, followed by a ‘bad’ alternative for a single round, and then ‘good’ alternatives for all remaining rounds.

However, the tendency to take exactly one round to adapt to changing circumstances counts against STOCHASTIC in the alternating model, since by the time it adapts the input distribution has changed again. Here we see the other algorithms performing well, achieving very close to optimal performance, while STOCHASTIC achieves very close to 0. Indeed, this model is tailored to suit UPDATE, which quickly learns to choose an alternative with some ‘A’ valuations, and the greedy algorithms, since it enables us to alternate which agents get the high valuations, keeping everyone roughly equally well-off at the end of every round.

6.2 Real Data: Power Boost Allocation

We ran the algorithms on real data gathered from a power boost allocation problem. In this problem, $n$ computer applications are each allocated a base level of power, and compete for $m < n$ additional (indivisible) units of extra power (power boosts) at each of $T$ rounds. For our instance, power boosts are allocated using RAPL [1] technology and each application’s performance is measured under base and high power limits, 30W and 130W, respectively. We evaluate Apache Spark [29] benchmarks. Table 1 lists the twelve Spark applications in our instance.

Each Spark application is defined by a fixed number of tasks. We profile tasks’ completion time. We define an application’s utility in a round as the number of tasks completed normalized by its total number of tasks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Spark Workloads</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>App</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DecisionTree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GradientBoostedTrees</td>
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<tr>
<td>LinearRegression</td>
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<tr>
<td>NaiveBayesian</td>
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<tr>
<td>SVM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pagerank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ConnectedComponents</td>
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<tr>
<td>TriangleCounting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since the length of the utility trace is shorter when profiles under boosted power, we use linear interpolation to extend the shorter trace. Thus, for each application \( a \), we estimate the base power utility \( (u_{a, t}) \) and boosted power utility \( (u_{a, t}^{\text{boost}}) \) in each round.

In our instance, there are two power boosts to be allocated. Therefore, at each round there are \( \binom{12}{2} \) alternatives, one for each pair of applications. For an alternative \( j \) corresponding to power boosts for applications \( a \) and \( b \), we have that \( V_t(a, j) = u_{a, t}^{\text{boost}} \cdot V_t(b, j) = u_{b, t}^{\text{boost}} \cdot V_t(c, j) = u_{c, t}^{\text{boost}} \) for all other applications \( c \neq a, b \). We have 120 rounds in the instance we tested.

The Nash Social Welfare achieved on this instance is shown in Figure 3, normalized against OPT. Most striking is the poor performance of STOCHASTIC. We hypothesize that this is due to some of the applications having long stretches of consecutive rounds where they achieve zero utility for all allocations, followed by short periods with positive reported utility. For these applications, the pattern of valuations looks most like the alternating distribution, where STOCHASTIC also performed poorly.

Also notable is the performance of LINEARGREEDY, which performs roughly twice as well as GREEDY and UPDATE. However, both of these consistently outperformed LINEARGREEDY for our simulated data. It is not yet clear to us whether there is a general structural property of this dataset which lends itself to LINEARGREEDY, or if its good performance was simply a chance occurrence.

Runtime results are similar to those presented in Section 6.1, with one exception. The time taken to solve the offline instance is 384 seconds, whereas UPDATE takes only 108 seconds. This provides evidence that, for large instances, the optimal MICP is prohibitively slow compared to our online algorithms. For comparison, the three other algorithms each ran in less than 0.2 seconds.

7. STRATEGIC ISSUES

In this section, we discuss strategic incentives of agents that arise in the dynamic setting. We emphasize again that, while we have no formal results regarding incentives, and what we do know is mostly negative, we consider the multiple objective framework from Section 1 to be important and interesting in and of itself, and here there are no strategic concerns. Of course, we consider the strategic aspect to be very interesting also and believe it to be a fruitful area for generating research questions.

Without the upper bound on valuations, \( K \), we might be worried about agents drastically overreporting their valuations. For instance, an agent could misreport some high valuation \( N \) in the first round and have their preferred alternative chosen. To compensate for this utility counting against them in the next round, they could report valuations on the order of \( N^2 \), then \( N^3 \), etc. Of course, with our upper bound in place, such a strategy would have to stop somewhere and could not be used to dominate every round (as it could if there was no bound).

Still, the setup and approaches described in this paper are highly vulnerable to strategic behaviour by the agents. The reason for this is that it is impossible to distinguish between an agent that is genuinely unhappy with choices made in previous rounds, and an agent simply pretending to be unhappy with previous alternatives. If we wish to compensate the former agent for their unhappiness, we must allow for the possibility of being gamed by the latter. This is essentially the free-rider problem well-known to economists (see, e.g., [12] for a discussion).
There are many interesting and unresolved questions in this domain. While we can not hope for strategy-proofness in the most general setting, are there restricted settings in which we do regain (limited) strategy-proofness? For instance, can we limit the expressiveness allowed to the agents in exchange for strategy-proofness? Can we say anything about the case where alternatives are simply different allocations of private goods (so that no agent may benefit directly from ‘free-riding’ on another agent’s high valuation)?

Even in the general setting, it may be true that agents never have an incentive to over-report their valuation in the case that \( T = \infty \). Intuitively, if the algorithm believes the agent has more utility than they really do, it can only hurt the agent in future rounds. However, we have neither a proof nor a counter-example to this (imprecise) statement.

8. APPLICATIONS

8.1 Voting

Our setup can be directly applied to voting, where agents are voters who report a utility for each of the alternatives. If voters are required to report only an ordering over alternatives within each round, then we can simply infer utilities according to a chosen scoring vector. For example, we could set \( V(i, j) = 1 \) if alternative \( j \) is voter \( i \)'s most preferred alternative and 0 otherwise (the plurality scoring vector), or \( V(i, j) = m - k \) when \( j \) is ranked \( k \)-th in \( i \)'s preference order (the Borda utility vector).

An interesting direction for future work is to investigate what social-choice theoretic properties are satisfied by the Nash social welfare in this repeated setting. One weak property is unanimity, which states that if all voters rank the same alternative at the top of their ordering, then that alternative should be chosen (in the dynamic setting we could require this on a round-by-round basis). Clearly all of the algorithms presented in this paper satisfy this condition for all monotone scoring vectors. Some other fundamental axioms also extend naturally to the dynamic setting, for example anonymity and neutrality (which we define for the dynamic setting in Section 2).

For some axioms, however, it is not so clear how to extend to the dynamic setting. For instance, consider the Condorcet criterion, which states that any alternative which achieves a pairwise majority against all other alternatives should be chosen. This makes sense in the one-shot setting, but maybe less sense in the dynamic case. Suppose that there are two alternatives, \( A \) and \( B \), and that 51% of voters prefer \( A \) to \( B \) in every round. Then the Condorcet criterion appears to say that we should choose \( A \) in every round, while fairness considerations dictate choosing \( B \) at least occasionally. It is not clear how we would extend the Condorcet criterion to the dynamic setting and, if we cannot, we may need novel axioms.

There is a natural link between repeated elections and the theory of multi-winner elections. In multi-winner elections, not only do we want to choose popular alternatives, but we also want to represent as many voters as possible, for which several rules have been designed [10, 20, 17]. Consider an election where the aim is to choose a committee of size \( k < m \). This is exactly equivalent to setting \( T = k \) and choosing a single distinct winner at each round, while also imposing the restriction that voters do not change their votes between rounds. Thus we can view multi-winner elections as a special case of repeated elections. It would be interesting to check whether any desiderata in the context of multi-winner elections extend naturally to the repeated setting.

8.2 Allocating Shared Resources

Consider a situation in which a group of agents take turns being allocated a shared resource for discrete units of time. Examples include allocating supercomputer time among members of a university department or assigning the use of a holiday home owned jointly by several people. In both cases, demand varies across time intervals and across agents. For instance, people who like skiing may want use of the holiday home in the winter, while those who like hiking may prefer a different season.

Another interesting aspect of these situations is that our notion of fairness may not be to treat all agents exactly equally. For instance, if people contributed unequally to the purchase of the holiday home, the group may decide that someone who paid twice as much as another person ‘deserves’ to get twice the benefit from the home. In the supercomputer example, we may wish to allocate time based on the amount of grant money contributed to the purchase of the machine (for example).

In these cases we may wish to generalize the Nash social welfare to the Cobb-Douglas welfare. The Cobb-Douglas welfare for utility vector \( v \), \( CD(v) \), is given by

\[
CD(v) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} v(i)^{\alpha_i},
\]

where \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \leq 1 \). The case where all \( \alpha_i = \frac{1}{k} \) is the special case of Nash social welfare, but setting other values of \( \alpha_i \) allows us to prioritize some agents over others. It is illuminating to consider the simple case where all agents have a common unit of utility (say, dollars). In this case, the Nash social welfare is maximized when all agents receive exactly the same utility. If we generalize the coefficients, then the Cobb-Douglas welfare is maximized when the agents receive utility in exactly the ratio of their exponents \( \alpha_i \). So if agent \( i \) contributed twice as much money to the purchase of the holiday home as agent \( j \), simply set \( \alpha_i = 2\alpha_j \).

9. CONCLUSION

Election designers and social choice researchers often do not consider the fact that many elections are conducted as sequences of related elections. In this work, we have provided a framework to allow for the design and analysis of dynamic election protocols, and repeated decision making rules generally. We have presented four candidate online algorithms for solving these dynamic problems. Our simulations do not determine a clear winner, but instead suggest that the right choice of algorithm is highly dependent on the setting and the model of how agents’ valuations change over time.

Our work is preliminary, and leaves a lot of scope for future research in addition to the specific directions already discussed. One direction would be to design a more precise model of voter preferences, possibly modeling changing preferences by an MDP as has been done in [9, 24]. We have also not considered modeling discounting of the agents’ utilities. It would also be nice to have provable guarantees on the regret of the greedy algorithms.