Classification with Few Tests through Self-Selection

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Abstract

We study test-based binary classification, where a principal either accepts or rejects agents based on the outcomes they get in a set of tests. The principal commits to a policy, which consists of all sets of outcomes that lead to acceptance. Each agent is modeled by a distribution over the space of possible outcomes. When an agent takes a test, he pays a cost and receives an independent sample from his distribution as the outcome. Agents can always choose between taking another test and stopping. They maximize their expected utility, which is the value of acceptance if the principal’s policy accepts the set of outcomes they have and 0 otherwise, minus the total cost of tests taken.

We focus on the case where agents can be either “good” or “bad” (corresponding to their distribution over test outcomes), and the principal’s goal is to accept good agents and reject bad ones. We show, roughly speaking, that as long as the good and bad agents have different distributions (which can be arbitrarily close to each other), the principal can always achieve perfect accuracy, meaning good agents are accepted with probability 1, and bad ones are rejected with probability 1. Moreover, there is a policy achieving perfect accuracy under which the maximum number of tests any agent needs to take is constant — in sharp contrast to the case where the principal directly observes samples from agents’ distributions. The key technique is to choose the policy so that agents self-select into taking tests.

1 Introduction

We often classify based on the outcomes of tests. In a narrow sense, tests can take the form of exams, with numerical scores as outcomes. For example, a course often has one or more midterm exams and one final exam, and the instructor uses the outcomes of these exams to decide the final grades of (i.e., to classify) students. More generally, a test can be any activity that takes a certain amount of effort and produces a verifiable outcome. Examples include job interviews, research paper submissions, etc. These outcomes, presumably correlated with the true skills of the test takers (henceforth the agents), are then used by a principal to classify them — the collective feedback from different interviewers determines whether the interviewee gets the job, and the list of papers one has published strongly affects one’s future opportunities as a researcher.

An agent’s performance on tests is inevitably random — on any given day, a capable student may not perform well due to being tired or sick, due to bad luck in which questions were selected, or for reasons that we cannot identify. For this reason, a principal generally is willing to take into consideration multiple test outcomes when making decisions. It then matters how these tests are offered to agents. Oversimplifying, there are two ways of offering tests: mandatory tests and optional tests. With mandatory tests, the principal decides which tests each agent should take and/or how many times they should take them, as well as which (combinations of) outcomes an agent needs to have in order to be classified into a certain category. A straightforward example of mandatory tests is students taking exams in school, where typically all students are required to take all exams in a course, whose outcomes together determine the final grade of the student. On the other hand, with optional tests, the principal decides the latter but not the former. One example is (an oversimplified version of) the academic job market, where agents’ publication records determine whether they are invited for an onsite interview, but agents can decide how often to put in the effort to prepare a new paper for submission to a conference or journal. At first glance, it may appear that mandatory tests allow the principal tighter control over the classification process, and therefore would benefit the principal more than optional tests. As a consequence, the principal should enforce mandatory tests whenever possible (or economically feasible). However, the above intuitive reasoning does not appear to be fully backed by evidence from reality: optional tests continue to be implemented in high-stakes classification tasks such as US college admissions.1 This raises the following question:

Are there any advantages of optional tests for classification over mandatory ones?

On top of that, in many other scenarios mandatory tests are simply unrealistic, and the principal has to rely on optional tests for decision-making — for example, it is impossible for an academic hiring committee to require job applicants to submit their work to certain conferences in a

1Applicants may take SAT and/or ACT tests, among others, as many times as they want.
prescribed way, e.g., one paper to NeurIPS’20 and one paper to ICML’21. In such cases, the principal would still like the classification process to be as accurate and efficient as possible. This leads us to the following question:

**How can one design a classification process with optional tests in the most accurate and/or efficient way?**

Our results. We give somewhat surprising answers to the above two questions in the case of binary classification of binary agents (elaborated below): we characterize the optimal design of a classification process with optional tests, and based on this show that classification with optional tests can be arbitrarily more efficient than optimal classification with mandatory tests for the same task.

To be more specific, we consider a setting where a principal either accepts or rejects agents based on the set of test outcomes that they get. Before tests are taken, the principal commits to a policy, which consists of all sets of outcomes that lead to acceptance. Each agent is modeled by a distribution over the space of possible outcomes, corresponding to how the agent tends to perform in a test. When an agent takes a test, he pays a cost and receives an independent sample from his distribution as the outcome. Agents can always choose between taking another test, and stopping. They maximize their expected utility, which is the value of acceptance if the principal’s policy accepts the set of outcomes they have and 0 otherwise, minus the total cost of tests taken.

We focus on the case where agents can be either “good” or “bad” (corresponding to two different distributions over test outcomes), and the principal’s goal is to accept good agents and reject bad ones. We first characterize the optimal strategy of an agent in response to the principal’s policy. Fixing the principal’s policy, each agent faces a Markov Decision Process (MDP), where the state is the set of test outcomes that he has collected. In general, at any state of the MDP, the agent can always choose between taking another test and stopping, and the optimal strategy could be any function mapping each combination of outcomes to one of the two actions. Our first key observation is that without loss of generality, the agent’s optimal strategy is either to keep taking tests until acceptance, or to leave immediately without taking any test. This is because intuitively, after taking some tests, the agent must have received some outcomes, which makes his situation at least as good as when he started in terms of the expected number of future tests he needs to take in order to be accepted; the cost of the tests already taken is sunk. So, if an agent ever chooses to start taking tests, he must be willing to keep taking tests until acceptance, since the cost of past tests should not affect his decision. This is making two assumptions: (1) the agent can choose not to submit some of the test outcomes, and (2) the agent already knows his own type (good or bad) at the beginning, and hence is not learning about himself from the test outcomes.

With agents’ optimal strategy characterized, we consider the principal’s problem, i.e., the design of her classification policy. We first study the case where the principal controls the cost of a test, by, for example, charging a registration fee. We show that in this case, as long as the good and bad agents have different distributions (which can be arbitrarily close to each other), the principal can always achieve perfect accuracy, meaning good agents are accepted with probability 1, and bad ones are rejected with probability 1. The key technique is to choose the policy so that agents self-select into (not) taking tests. Moreover, among perfectly accurate policies, we characterize the one with stochastically dominant efficiency in terms of the number of tests a good agent needs to take in order to be accepted. We show that quite surprisingly, under this policy, no agent ever has to take more than 2 tests. One may contrast this with the mandatory tests case, where the principal directly observes as many samples as she wants from agents’ distributions — there, in order to classify correctly with probability 2/3, the number of tests required can be arbitrarily large, as the distance between the good and bad distributions diminishes.

We then proceed to the case where the cost per test is fixed externally. With discrete outcomes, we show that perfect accuracy in general is no longer possible. We then consider the special case with continuous outcome distributions, or equivalently, where outcomes are associated with rich noise that is effectively continuous. We show that in a continuous world, with different good and bad distributions, perfect accuracy is again always possible. Moreover, we construct a perfectly accurate policy under which the maximum number of tests a good agent needs to take is \(\lfloor 1/c \rfloor + 1\) where \(c\) is the fixed cost per test, and show this is essentially best possible for perfectly accurate policies. We also provide evidence that the above bound cannot be significantly improved even if we consider the expected number of tests.

**Related work.** Our results are along the line of work on strategic machine learning (Dalvi et al. 2004; Perote-Pena 2004; Dekel, Fischer, and Procaccia 2010; Brückner, Kanzow, and Scheffer 2012; Meir, Procaccia, and Rosenschein 2012; Cai, Daskalakis, and Papadimitriou 2015; Hardt et al. 2016; Roughgarden and Schrijvers 2017; Chen et al. 2018; Dong et al. 2018; Feng, Parkes, and Xu 2019; Chen, Liu, and Podimata 2020; Freeman et al. 2020), as well as causality interpretations thereof (Bechavod et al. 2020; Perdono et al. 2020; Shavit, Edelman, and Axelrod 2020). Most research on strategic machine learning, including ours, aims to tackle the potential (mis)alignment of interests between the learner (i.e., the principal) and entities about which information is being learned (i.e., agents). One key difference between our results and existing research is that previous work along this line typically focuses on preventing strategic manipulation of the classification process, while we exploit agents’ incentives to make classification more accurate and efficient. Exceptions are the recent results by Kleinberg and Raghavan (2019) and Haghhtalab et al. (2020), who study the improvement in agents’ true features (e.g., skills) that is encouraged by the classifier deployed by the principal. In contrast to their work, we consider a model where agents’ features (i.e., the distributions associated with them) are fixed throughout the classification process.
Closely related to our results is the series of work by Zhang, Cheng, and Conitzer (2019a,b). There, too, agents observe samples from distributions associated with them, which they can then strategically transform and subsequently submit to the principal for classification. Our results differ from these results in that we consider a novel model where the number of samples generated is endogenous, depending on utility-maximizing agents’ private information, whereas they assume the number of samples is exogenous (fixed externally).

There is a rich literature in economics on screening with tests, and the effect of self-selection therein (Mirrlees 1976; Spence 1978; Guasch and Weiss 1981; Nalebuff and Scharfstein 1987; Loh 1994). Most of those results consider one-time tests with clearly defined outcomes (e.g., pass or fail), and the principal (e.g., a hiring firm) often cares about maximizing revenue or social welfare, rather than achieving high accuracy or efficiency. In contrast, we consider repeated tests with an arbitrary outcome space, and the primary goal is to achieve high accuracy and efficiency.

A conceptually related topic is that of efficient statistics, where some basic and commonly studied problems are distinguishing, learning (Chan et al. 2014), and testing (Dikakonikolas, Kane, and Nikishkin 2015; Valiant and Valiant 2017) distributions. Our results can be viewed as efficiently distinguishing distributions in the presence of strategic behavior.

## 2 Preliminaries

In this section, we formally define the problem of test-based classification.

### Agents, tests, and outcomes.

Each agent is modeled by a distribution $D$ over a space $O$ of possible test outcomes (e.g., integers between 0 and 100, corresponding to numerical scores). Agents can choose to take as many tests as they want. When an agent with distribution $D$ takes a test, he receives an outcome drawn from $D$ independently of past test outcomes, and can then choose to continue taking tests, or to stop. The outcomes of all the tests taken (which form a multiset whose elements are from the outcome space $O$) will then be used by the principal for classification.

### The principal and the policy.

The principal, before agents decide whether or not to take tests, announces a policy $\mathcal{P}$ for classification. The policy in general is a collection of multisets, each of which consists of certain test outcomes from the outcome space $O$. For an agent with outcomes $S$, the policy $\mathcal{P}$ accepts the agent if there is a multiset $T \in \mathcal{P}$ such that $T \subseteq S$ (i.e., the multiplicity of any element in $T$ is no larger than that of the same element in $S$). In other words, the policy $\mathcal{P}$ provides a collection of options to agents, each of which is a multiset $T$ of outcomes. An agent is accepted iff his multiset of test outcomes contains any of these options as a subset. A simple and natural example is when $O$ is the set of integers between 0 and 100, and $\mathcal{P}$ contains a number of singleton multisets, each of which is an integer between 60 and 100, i.e.,

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ \{i\} \mid 60 \leq i \leq 100 \}.$$ 

This corresponds to the case where agents can repeatedly take exams, and are accepted (i.e., pass) iff they ever get a score of at least 60. Another example would be

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ \{i\} \mid 60 \leq i \leq 100 \} \cup \{ \{i,j\} \mid 50 \leq i,j \leq 60 \},$$

which is the same policy as before, except it now also suffices to score at least 50 twice.

### How rational agents act in response to a policy.

Fixing a policy $\mathcal{P}$, each agent faces an MDP, where the goal is to maximize his expected utility. Below we describe this MDP.

Without loss of generality, being accepted gives agents value 1, and each test has a cost of $0 \leq c \leq 1$ (otherwise agents would never want to take any test). The states of the MDP, denoted $S$, are all multisets over the outcome space $O$, corresponding to the set of outcomes the agent has collected so far. Initially, the state of the agent is the empty set $\emptyset$. At any state $S \in S$, the agent can choose between two actions, taking another test ($T$) or leaving ($L$). If the agent chooses $T$, he pays cost $c$ (i.e., receives reward $-c$), and transitions to a new state $S' \cup \{o\}$ (note that this is a union of two multisets, where the multiplicity of any element in the union is the sum of those of the same element in the two operands), where $o \sim D$ is a random outcome drawn from $D$. If the agent chooses $L$, he receives reward 1 if his current multiset of outcomes $S$ is accepted by the policy $\mathcal{P}$, and 0 otherwise; in either case, the MDP terminates immediately. Throughout the paper, we assume agents are perfectly rational and always play the utility-maximizing action. For simplicity, we assume agents always break ties in favor of leaving, i.e., when the two actions result in equal expected utility, they always play $L$. Our results still hold (with minor modifications) even if agents break ties adversarially.

### The principal’s goals.

We consider two goals of the principal, accuracy and efficiency. We focus on the case where agents are either good (with distribution $G$) or bad (with distribution $B$), and the principal aims to accept as many good agents as possible, and reject as many bad ones as possible.

The specific definition of accuracy is immaterial — as we will show, the principal can always achieve perfect accuracy (i.e., good agents are always accepted, and bad ones always rejected) as long as $G$ and $B$ are not identical. Given perfect accuracy, the principal may further hope to implement the classification in an efficient way, where agents take as few tests as possible. We consider two types of efficiency measures, the expected number of tests and the worst-case number of tests. The goal is to design perfectly accurate policies which (approximately) minimize either/both of these two measures (though in Section 4.3 we do consider how to minimize expected cost in our model under the constraint of perfect accuracy).

### Control over the costs.

In some scenarios, the cost of a test is controlled by the principal (e.g., when the dominant
3 Agents’ Optimal Strategy: Self-Selection

We first characterize agents’ best response to a policy, which effectively makes their decision space binary, and greatly simplifies the principal’s problem.

Lemma 1. Fixing a policy $\mathcal{P}$ and a cost per test $c$, the optimal expected reward of any agent is achieved by one of the following two strategies:

- Take no test (i.e., play $L$ immediately) and leave with reward $0$.
- Keep taking tests (i.e., playing $T$) until the set of outcomes collected is accepted by $\mathcal{P}$, and then play $L$.

Moreover, the optimal strategy is unique iff the above two strategies result in strictly different expected rewards.

The proof of Lemma 1, as well as all other proofs, is deferred to the appendix. Again, the intuition is that if an agent ever wants to start taking tests, then after taking some tests, he will be in at least as favorable a position as at the beginning in terms of tests passed, and it was worth it to start then, so it must certainly be worth it to continue now (the cost of previous tests is sunk, and therefore irrelevant). One important implication is that, depending on the policy, the cost per test, and the agent’s distribution, each agent either does not attempt to get accepted at all, or keeps trying and eventually gets accepted with probability 1. This indicates that, when provided the right incentives, self-selecting agents may perform the classification for the principal in a perfectly accurate way.

More specifically, for any policy $\mathcal{P}$ and distribution $D$ over the outcome space $O$, let $T(\mathcal{P}, D)$ denote the (random) number of tests an agent with distribution $D$ needs to take in order to be accepted by $\mathcal{P}$, i.e.,

$$T(\mathcal{P}, D) = \min\{t \mid D^{\times t} \subseteq D^{\times t+1} \},$$

where $\{o_t\}_{t \geq 1}$ are iid draws from $D$. We have the following claim.

Lemma 2. Fix a policy $\mathcal{P}$ and a cost per test $c$. An agent with distribution $D$ will always keep taking tests until acceptance if

$$c \cdot E[\{o_t\}_{t \geq 1} \sim D^{\times t+1} | T(\mathcal{P}, D)] < 1,$$

and leave immediately otherwise.

In the rest of the paper, we will heavily exploit Lemma 2.

4 The Flexible-Cost Case

We begin our investigation with the case where the cost of a test is set by the principal, which turns out to be simpler. For simplicity, we assume the outcome space $O = [k] = \{1, \ldots, k\}$ for some integer $k > 0$. For any distribution $D$ over $O$ (which can be either $G$ or $B$), for any $S \subseteq O$, let $D(S) = \Pr_{o \sim D}[o \in S]$. As a shorthand, for any $o \in O$, let $D(o) = D(\{o\})$. All the results in this section can be easily generalized to arbitrary outcome spaces.\(^2\)

4.1 Memoryless Policies Suffice for Accurate Classification

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4.2 Policy with Stochastically Dominant Efficiency

We now proceed to efficient policies. Below we characterize the perfectly implementable policy $P$ with stochastically dominant efficiency for any good distribution $G$ and bad distribution $B$. The number of tests required for a good agent to be accepted under this policy, $T(P, G)$, stochastically dominates the same number, $T(P', G)$, of any other perfectly implementable policy $P'$. Furthermore, under this policy, any good agent is guaranteed to be accepted after taking at most 2 tests. As a result, this policy achieves the optimal expected number of tests, the optimal worst-case number of tests (which is 2), and optimality with respect to almost any reasonable measure of efficiency.

**Theorem 2.** Let $P \subseteq O = \{k\}$ be a set of outcomes such that

$$P = \{ \{o\} \mid o \in P \} \cup \{ \{o_1, o_2\} \mid o_1, o_2 \in O \}$$

is perfectly implementable, and stochastically dominates any other perfectly implementable policy $P'$, in the sense that for any $t \in \mathbb{Z}_+$,

$$\Pr[T(P, G) \leq t] \geq \Pr[T(P', G) \leq t].$$

The policy $P$ constructed in Theorem 2 accepts any set of outcomes which either contains some outcome in $P \subseteq O$, or has cardinality at least 2. In other words, $P$ accepts an agent if she first receives any outcome in $P$, or he ever takes 2 tests. One may contrast Theorem 2 with the setting where the principal, rather than the agent himself, chooses the number of tests each agent needs to take. Suppose, rather than deploying a policy and letting agents themselves choose whether or not to take tests, we directly observe iid samples from an unknown distribution $D$, which can be either $G$ or $B$ — this corresponds to the case where we simply ask each agent to take as many tests as we want. There, how many samples one needs to observe in order to tell with confidence whether $D$ is $G$ or $B$ depends on the total variation distance between $G$ and $B$, defined below.

**Definition 3 (Total Variation Distance).** The total variation distance $d_{TV}(D_1, D_2)$ between two distributions $D_1$ and $D_2$ over $O$ is defined as

$$d_{TV}(D_1, D_2) = \sup_{S \subseteq O} (D_1(S) - D_2(S)).$$

Observe that $G \neq B$ iff $d_{TV}(G, B) > 0$. It is folklore that in order to identify $D$ with probability at least $2/3$, one needs $\Omega(d_{TV}(G, B)^{-2})$ iid samples from $D$. Moreover, it is easy to see that as long as the supports of $G$ and $B$ overlap, one can never be completely sure with any finite number of samples. Theorem 2, on the other hand, essentially says that whenever $d_{TV}(G, B) > 0$, the principal never needs to observe more than 2 samples in order to distinguish $G$ and $B$, and good agents never need to take more than 2 tests. In other words, by incentivizing self-selection, the principal is able to reduce the number of tests required dramatically, from $\Omega(d_{TV}(G, B)^{-2})$ to 2, and at the same time improve the accuracy to 1. Perhaps even more surprisingly, this is done by giving agents more freedom to choose the number of tests they take. Of course, this is feasible only because agents themselves know their distribution at the outset; if nobody knows the distribution, $\Omega(d_{TV}(G, B)^{-2})$ tests would still be required. This partially explains the practical success of classification with optimal tests: they can be arbitrarily more efficient than mandatory tests enforced by the principal, especially when good and bad agents’ distributions are closer to each other and therefore are harder to distinguish.

4.3 Cost Efficiency of Policies

While the policy in Theorem 2 is efficient in terms of the number of tests, it could impose a total expected cost on good agents that is quite close to the benefit of being accepted. Depending on the circumstances, cost efficiency may be considered more important, and indeed, often the classification procedure can be implemented in much less costly ways, intuitively for the following reasons. First, when $G$ and $B$ are hard to distinguish, it is natural that good agents need to spend significant effort in order to distinguish themselves from bad ones. But, in many real-world scenarios, (most) good agents are considerably different from (most) bad ones. In such cases, good agents pay much less cost, since the principal only needs to make bad agents marginally unwilling to take tests. Second, there can be a tradeoff between efficiency (i.e., the number of tests taken) and cost. If the principal is willing to make good agents take more than 2 tests, then she can design a more selective policy (i.e., making it hard to pass) that creates a sharper separation between good and bad agents, and set a lower cost per test to achieve perfect accuracy. Below we formalize this intuition, and characterize the optimal cost efficiency possible, subject to perfect accuracy, for memoryless policies.

**Theorem 3.** Fix any good distribution $G$ and bad distribution $B$ over the outcome space $O = \{k\}$ where $G \neq B$. There exists a memoryless policy

$$P = \{ \{o\} \mid o \in P \}$$

for some $P \subseteq O$, and a cost per test $c$, such that $(P, c)$ is perfectly accurate, and the expected total cost paid by good agents is

$$c \cdot \mathbb{E}[T(P, G)] = \min_{o \in O} B(o)/G(o).$$

Moreover, no policy-cost pair $(P', c')$ satisfies (1) $P'$ is memoryless, and (2) the expected total cost paid by good agents is

$$c' \cdot \mathbb{E}[T(P', G)] < \min_{o \in O} B(o)/G(o).$$

The above theorem says that the optimal cost efficiency achievable by memoryless policies is determined by the minimum ratio between $B$ and $G$ over the test outcome space. We also remark that cost efficiency directly implies robustness against bad agents who value acceptance more than good agents. Fixing any good distribution $G$ and bad
distribution \( B \), when good agents have value 1 and bad agents have value \( v > 1 \) for acceptance, there exists a perfectly implementable policy iff the optimal cost efficiency achievable when all agents have value 1 is better than \( v^{-1} \), i.e., there exists a policy-cost pair \((P, c)\) such that
\[
c \cdot \mathbb{E}[TP(G, B)] < v^{-1} \quad \text{and} \quad c \cdot \mathbb{E}[TP(P, G)] \geq 1.
\]
In fact, given such a cost efficient pair \((P, c)\), \((P, v \cdot c)\) is a perfectly accurate pair when bad agents have value \( v \geq 1 \) for acceptance.

5 The Fixed-Cost Case

Now we proceed to the more challenging setting where the cost per test \( c \) is fixed externally. We show that in such cases, perfect accuracy in general requires stronger conditions on the good and bad distributions. However, as we argue below, these conditions are still rather reasonable for practical purposes.

5.1 Accurate Classification Requires Continuous Information

When the cost per test is set by the principal, Theorem 1 states that perfect accuracy can be achieved by some policy-cost pair as long as the good and bad distributions are different. However, this is not true when the cost \( 0 < c < 1 \) is fixed, as illustrated in the following example.

Example 1. Suppose the cost per test is fixed at \( c = 0.9 \). The outcome space \( O = \{1, 2\} \), the good distribution \( G \) assigns probability \( G(1) = G(2) = 0.5 \), and the bad distribution \( B \) assigns \( B(1) = 0 \) and \( B(2) = 1 \). Suppose there is a policy \( P \) such that \( (P, c) \) is perfectly accurate. Then, in order for good agents to take tests, by Lemma 2,
\[
\mathbb{E}[TP(G, B)] < 10/9,
\]
and since \( T(P, G) \) is distributed over \( \mathbb{Z}_+ \), elementary calculation gives
\[
\Pr[T(P, G) = 1] > 8/9.
\]
As a result, it must be the case that \( \{1\} \in P \) and \( \{2\} \in P \) simultaneously. However, this implies
\[
\Pr[T(P, B) = 1] = 1 \implies \mathbb{E}[TP(P, B)] < 10/9.
\]
So bad agents will also take tests and get accepted under \((P, c)\), a contradiction. In other words, no policy \( P \) exists such that \( (P, c) \) is perfectly accurate.

The above example shows that perfect accuracy cannot be achieved with an infeasibly high cost per test, even if the outcome space is extremely simple (i.e., binary) and the good and bad distributions are clearly different. Nevertheless, the impossibility of perfect accuracy comes almost solely from the discreteness in the outcomes — intuitively, accepting only one of the two outcomes does not provide enough motivation for good agents to take tests, while accepting both provides too much motivation, so that every agent wants to take tests regardless of his distribution.

Real-world tests, however, are often intrinsically (approximately) continuous. In a narrow sense, test outcomes, in the form of numerical scores, usually range from 0 to 100, where presumably an agent can get any integer score in between with positive probability. As argued above, in a broader sense, a test could be any activity which takes a certain effort and produces a verifiable outcome. Besides numerical test scores, such an outcome could take the form of a course project, a research paper, or an oral presentation. These outcomes are essentially continuous, in the sense that, for example, no two oral presentations are exactly the same, even if they are given by the same presenter using the same slides. Even for relatively discrete outcome spaces, an outcome is often accompanied by arbitrarily rich noise, which makes outcomes effectively continuous.\(^4\) For example, in a simplistic model, a paper submitted to a conference can be either accepted or rejected, so one could argue the outcome of such a submission is binary. However, it is extremely unlikely that two different papers (as PDF files) share the same hash value, which can effectively be viewed as continuous noise that we can add to the outcome, thereby making the outcome space continuous. This (hash value) part of the enriched outcome may not be correlated with the type of the agent, but that will not matter for our purposes.

Based on the above observations, in the rest of this section, we assume the outcome space \( O \), as well as the good distribution \( G \) and the bad distribution \( B \), is continuous. This could model continuity in the outcome distribution itself, or noise, or the two aspects in combination. More specifically, without loss of generality, we assume \( O = [0, k] \) for some positive integer \( k \in \mathbb{Z}_+ \), and the good distribution \( G \) (resp. the bad distribution \( B \)) is constant when restricted to the interval \([i − 1, i]\) for any \( i \in [k] = \{1, \ldots, k\} \). We call such distributions piecewise constant.\(^5\) One way to interpret this is that there are \( k \) possible outcomes. A good (resp. bad) agent receives the \( i \)-th outcome with probability \( G([i − 1, i]) \) (resp. \( B([i − 1, i]) \)). Moreover, there is continuous noise \( x \) independent of the outcome and the agent type, uniformly distributed over \([0, 1]\), so the final combination of the outcome and the noise, \( i − x \), has distribution \( G \) (resp. \( B \)). As a shorthand, for any \( i \in [k] \), let \( G(i) = G([i − 1, i]) \), and \( B(i) = B([i − 1, i]) \). While for ease of presentation we focus on this specific model, in fact, our results apply to general distributions satisfying certain continuity conditions.\(^6\)

5.2 Accurate Classification with Continuous Outcomes

Under the continuity assumption, we now show that perfect accuracy is possible with fixed cost per test, whenever the good and bad distributions, \( G \) and \( B \), are not identical.

\(^4\)This has also been observed, e.g., in (Zhang, Cheng, and Conitzer 2019b).

\(^5\)While this appears to be a more restrictive definition than the common notion of piecewise constant distributions, observe that without loss of generality, one can always scale the pieces and the distributions simultaneously, such that the pieces are of the same length.

\(^6\)For example, it is known that all Lebesgue measurable functions (including all continuous ones) are approximated by step functions (i.e., piecewise constant ones) up to any precision. This gives a way of generalizing our results to all Lebesgue measurable density functions.
Moreover, as in the variable cost case, perfect accuracy again can be achieved using a memoryless policy.

**Theorem 4.** When the outcome space $O = [0, k]$, for any cost per test $0 < c < 1$, and good and bad distributions $G$ and $B$ (where $G \neq B$) that are constant on $[i - 1, i]$ for any $i \in [k]$, there exists a policy $P$ such that $(P, c)$ is perfectly accurate for $G$ and $B$. Moreover, $P$ consists of only singleton sets of outcomes.

### 5.3 Nearly Optimal Policies

As illustrated by Theorem 2, memoryless policies do not generally achieve optimal efficiency when the cost per test is set by the principal. The same intuition applies to the fixed cost case as well. Below, we construct a policy for any piecewise constant and distinct good and bad distributions which requires at most $\lfloor 1/c \rfloor + 1$ tests, where $c$ is the cost per test. We then show that the policy we construct has (1) optimal worst case efficiency, and (2) approximately optimal expected efficiency when the good and bad distributions are not trivially different.

**Theorem 5.** When the outcome space is $O = [0, k]$, for any cost per test $0 < c < 1$, and good and bad distributions $G$ and $B$ (where $G \neq B$) that are constant on $[i - 1, i]$ for any $i \in [k]$, there exists a policy $P$ such that $(P, c)$ is perfectly accurate for $G$ and $B$. Moreover,

$$\Pr[T(P, G) \leq \lfloor 1/c \rfloor + 1] = 1.$$ 

Unlike Theorem 2, the above policy-cost pair is not guaranteed to dominate all other perfectly accurate pairs. However, it is in fact optimal in terms of the maximum number of tests a good agent may have to take before getting accepted, as long as the good and bad distributions share the same support.

**Proposition 1.** For any piecewise constant good and bad distributions $G$ and $B$ where $G$ and $B$ share the same support, if a policy-cost pair $(P, c)$ is perfectly accurate, then

$$\Pr[T(P, G) < \lfloor 1/c \rfloor + 1] < 1.$$ 

In other words, the maximum number of tests a good agent may have to take is at least $\lfloor 1/c \rfloor + 1$.

Proposition 1 states that the policy constructed in Theorem 5 is in fact optimal in terms of the maximum number of tests any good agent may have to take. However, it is unclear whether one can do significantly better in terms of the expected number of tests, especially when the good and bad distributions are sufficiently different. We do show that, even when good and bad distributions are far apart (i.e., when $d_{TV}(G, B) = \Omega(1)$), there still exist good and bad distributions $G$ and $B$ such that the expected number of tests required is at least $1/2c$. In other words, the policy constructed in Theorem 5 is also asymptotically optimal (in a worst-case sense) in terms of the expected number of tests.

---

\footnote{It is certainly possible to do somewhat better. For example, when $G([0, 1]) = B([1, 2]) = 0.9$, $G([1, 2]) = B([0, 1]) = 0.1$, and the cost per test $c = 0.5$, $P = \{\{o\} : o \in [0, 1]\}$ accepts a good agent after $10/9 < 1/c + 1 = 3$ tests in expectation. $(P, c)$ is perfectly accurate, because a bad agent will require 10 tests in expectation, so a bad agent will not attempt the test.}

### 6 Conclusion and Future Research

In this paper, we characterize the accuracy and efficiency of classification with optional tests. Our results partially explain the practical success of optional tests, and provide a principled way of designing accurate and efficient classification processes. In particular, we show how much better one can do with self-selection than in comparable settings without self-selection that were studied recently, even when we augment those models with self-selection in the simplest possible way. Our results also easily generalize to some richer settings. For example, if taking the test might make one better at the test next time (due to practice), this retains the key property that once an agent starts taking tests, that agent will continue until the agent succeeds. For future directions, one could relax some of the assumptions to obtain more robustness in the design of classification processes. For example, test outcomes might be strategically transformed (as studied in [Zhang, Cheng, and Conitzer 2019a]), the cost per test might be unknown, and agents might not be completely sure about their own distributions before taking tests.
**Ethics Statement**

Our results help explain the practical success of classification with optional tests. By characterizing the optimal policy with optional tests, our results provide a principled way of designing classification criteria which are provably accurate and efficient. Such criteria could be applied in classification tasks with potential social impact, e.g., college admissions. Of course, our results could be used for classification with harmful objectives and exacerbate the damage.

**References**


A  Omitted Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the agent’s distribution is \( D \). Let \( \pi : S \to \{T, L\} \) be any strategy of the agent (which specifies the action to take at each state), and \( V : S \to \mathbb{R}_+ \) be the expected onward utility of the agent by playing \( \pi \), i.e.,

\[
V(S) = \begin{cases} 
|\mathcal{P} \text{ accepts } S|, & \text{if } \pi(S) = L \\
-c + \mathbb{E}_{o \sim D}[V(S \cup \{o\})], & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

\( \mathbb{I}[\cdot] \) above denotes the indicator of a statement. Suppose \( \pi \) does not play \( L \) immediately, or keeps playing \( T \) till the set of outcomes can be accepted. Formally, suppose \( V(\emptyset) > 0 \) (which is possible only when \( \pi(\emptyset) = T \), and there exists \( S \) not accepted by \( \mathcal{P} \), where \( \pi(S) = L \) (so \( V(S) = 0 \)).\(^8\) Without loss of generality, let \( S \) be a state with the smallest cardinality among those satisfying this condition, which implies that for any \( S' \subseteq S \), \( \pi(S') = T \). We show that such a policy cannot be optimal, which implies the claim to be proved.

Consider an extended version of the original MDP, where the state space is all ordered sequences of outcomes. At state \((o_1, \ldots, o_t)\) (here the notation \(...) emphasizes the fact that the sequence of outcomes is ordered), if action \( L \) is played, the MDP terminates and the agent gains reward \( \mathbb{I}[\mathcal{P} \text{ accepts } \{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}] \). If action \( T \) is played, the agent gains reward \(-c\) and transitions to state \((o_1, \ldots, o_t, o_{t+1})\), where \( o_{t+1} \sim D \). Observe that the optimal expected reward in the extended MDP is the same as that in the original MDP. So, to show that \( \pi \) is suboptimal in the original MDP, we only need to construct a strategy in the extended MDP with higher expected reward. Consider the following policy \( \pi' \) in the extended MDP, which mimics \( \pi \) unless the first \(|S|\) outcomes are exactly \( S \), in which case it drops these outcomes and starts over.

\[
\pi'(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) = \begin{cases} 
\pi(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\} \setminus S), & \text{if } \{o_1, \ldots, o_t, o_1\} = S \\
\pi(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}), & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

Consider the expected reward \( V' \) of \( \pi' \). First observe that for any state \((o_1, \ldots, o_t)\), if \( t \geq |S| \) and \( \{o_1, \ldots, o_t\} \neq S \), then \( V'(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) = V(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) \). We now argue \( V'(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) > 0 = V(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) \) when \( \{o_1, \ldots, o_t\} = S \). We couple the onward outcomes from \((o_1, \ldots, o_t)\) in the extended MDP with the sequence of outcomes in the original MDP (both are iid draws from \( D \)), and argue that for any such sequence \( o_{t+1}, \ldots, o_T \), the reward collected by \( \pi' \) on this sequence is at least the reward collected by \( \pi \) starting from the initial state \( \emptyset \). There are essentially two cases.

- \( \pi \) keeps taking tests on \( o_{t+1}, \ldots, o_T \). Here, both \( \pi \) and \( \pi' \) gain reward \(-c \times (t' - t - 1)\).
- \( \pi \) decides to leave after receiving outcome \( o_{t''} \), where \( t + 1 \leq t'' \leq t' \). Here, \( \pi \) gains reward 

\[
-c \times (t'' - t - 1) + \mathbb{I}[\mathcal{P} \text{ accepts } \{o_{t+1}, \ldots, o_{t''}\}].
\]

On the other hand, \( \pi' \) gains reward

\[
-c \times (t'' - t - 1) + \mathbb{I}[\mathcal{P} \text{ accepts } \{o_1, \ldots, o_{t''}\}],
\]

which is at least the reward \( \pi \) gains, since \( \{o_1, \ldots, o_{t''}\} \supseteq \{o_{t+1}, \ldots, o_T\} \).

So in any case \( \pi' \) collects no less reward than \( \pi \) on \( o_{t+1}, \ldots, o_T \), and as a result,

\[
V'(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) \geq V(\emptyset) > 0.
\]

Summarizing the above, for any state \((o_1, \ldots, o_t)\) where \( t = |S| \), we have \( V(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) \leq V'(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) \), and the inequality is strict when \( \{o_1, \ldots, o_t\} = S \). Now we can apply backward induction, and show that for any \((o_1, \ldots, o_t)\) where \( t < |S| \), \( V(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) \leq V'(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) \), and the inequality is strict when \( \{o_1, \ldots, o_t\} \subseteq S \). This is possible since by the choice of \( S \), for any such state, \( \pi(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) = \pi'(\{o_1, \ldots, o_t\}) = T \). In particular, we have \( V(\emptyset) < V'(()) \) (i.e., \( V' \) of the empty sequence of outcomes), as desired. This implies that \( \pi \) is suboptimal in the original MDP, and concludes the proof.

\[\square\]

Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the optimal strategy of an agent with distribution \( D \). In light of Lemma 1, we only need to consider the expected reward when the agent keeps taking tests until he is accepted, and compare that against 0, which is the reward of leaving immediately. If the agent keeps taking tests, his expected cumulative reward is precisely

\[
\mathbb{E}_{(o_1)}[1 - c \cdot T(\mathcal{P}, D)].
\]

So, taking tests until acceptance is more preferable if this number is strictly greater than 0, i.e.,

\[
c \cdot \mathbb{E}_{(o_1)}[T(\mathcal{P}, D)] < 1,
\]

which is precisely the condition in the claim.

\[\square\]

\(^8\)This leaves the case where \( V(\emptyset) = 0 \) and \( \pi(\emptyset) = T \). However, in that case, playing \( L \) immediately is also an optimal strategy.
Proof of Lemma 3. When the condition holds, one may choose any
\[ c \in \left(1 / \mathbb{E}[T(P, B)], 1 / \mathbb{E}[T(P, G)]\right). \]

Lemma 2 then guarantees that \((P, c)\) is perfectly accurate. When the condition does not hold, for any \(c \geq 0\), we always have
\[ c \cdot \mathbb{E}[T(P, G)] \geq c \cdot \mathbb{E}[T(P, B)], \]
and by Lemma 2 such a pair \((P, c)\) cannot be perfectly accurate. □

Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the theorem by construction. The idea is to focus on some particular outcome \(o^*\) where \(G(o^*) > B(o^*)\) and let \(P = \{\{o^*\}\}\). So for each test, the probability that a good agent gets outcome \(o^*\) and therefore gets accepted is strictly greater than the same probability for a bad agent. The principal can then set the cost per test \(c\) properly so that good agents strictly prefer taking tests, while bad agents strictly prefer leaving directly.

First, since \(G \neq B\) and \(O = [k]\) is finite, there exists some \(o^* \in O\) such that \(G(o^*) > B(o^*) \geq 0\). Let \(P = \{\{o^*\}\}\) as stated above. Consider the situation of good agents. Each time a good agent takes a test, the probability that he receives outcome \(o^*\) is \(G(o^*)\), so \(T(P, G)\) follows a geometric distribution with parameter \(G(o^*)\), and we have
\[ \mathbb{E}[T(P, G)] = G(o^*)^{-1}. \]
Similarly, for bad agents we have
\[ \mathbb{E}[T(P, B)] = B(o^*)^{-1} > G(o^*)^{-1} = \mathbb{E}[T(P, G)]. \]
By Lemma 3, this immediately implies that \(P\) is perfectly implementable. □

Proof of Theorem 2. We first show the easy part, i.e., \(P\) is perfectly implementable. By Lemma 3, this is equivalent to
\[ \mathbb{E}[T(P, G)] < \mathbb{E}[T(P, B)]. \]
Below we compute both. Observe that for any distribution \(D\) over \(O\),
\[ \Pr[T(P, D) \leq 2] = 1. \]

For \(G\),
\[ \Pr[T(P, G) = 1] = \Pr[o \in P] = G(P). \]
So
\[ \mathbb{E}[T(P, G)] = G(P) + 2(1 - G(P)) = 2 - G(P). \]
Similarly,
\[ \mathbb{E}[T(P, B)] = 2 - B(P), \]
which by the choice of \(P\) is strictly larger than \(2 - G(P)\). This guarantees that \(P\) is perfectly implementable.

Now consider any perfectly implementable policy \(P'\). We show that for any \(t \in \mathbb{Z}_+\),
\[ \Pr[T(P, G) \leq t] \geq \mathbb{E}[T(P', G) \leq t]. \]
Since
\[ \Pr[T(P, G) \leq 2] = 1, \]
we only need to show that
\[ \Pr[T(P, G) = 1] \geq \mathbb{E}[T(P', G) = 1]. \]
Suppose towards a contradiction the opposite. We argue below that \(P'\) cannot be perfectly implementable.
Let
\[ P' = \{o \mid P' \text{ accepts } \{o\}\}. \]
By our assumption on \(P'\),
\[ G(P) = \Pr_{o \sim G} [P \text{ accepts } \{o\}] = \Pr[T(P, G) = 1] \]
\[ < \mathbb{E}[T(P', G) = 1] = \Pr_{o \sim G} [P' \text{ accepts } \{o\}] = G(P'). \]
Then by the choice of \(P\), we have \(G(P') \leq B(P')\). We argue below that this implies
\[ \mathbb{E}[T(P', G)] \geq \mathbb{E}[T(P', B)], \]
and as a result, \(P'\) is not perfectly implementable.
First we construct Proof of Theorem 3. So by Lemma 2, bad agents never take tests. For good agents, $B \geq k = |O|$. Moreover, if $k' = k$, then

$$\Pr[T(P', G) = 1] = \Pr[T(P', B) = 1] = B(P').$$

To analyze $\Pr[T(P', G) = t]$ and $\Pr[T(P', B) = t]$ for $t > 1$, we need to take a closer look at $P'$, $G$ and $B$. Without loss of generality, assume $P' = [k'] = \{1, \ldots, k'\}$ for some $k' \leq k = |O|$. Then for good agents, the expected total cost can be bounded in the following way.

$$\text{Let } \{g_t\}_t \text{ be iid real numbers distributed uniformly at random over } [0, 1], \text{ and } \alpha = \sum_{i \in [k]} \min(G(i), B(i)).$$

Let $g_t$ be defined in the following way.

$$g_t = \begin{cases} \min \left\{ i \in [k], \sum j \in [i] \min(G(j), B(j)) \geq \theta_t \right\}, & \text{if } \theta_t \leq \alpha \\ \min \left\{ i \in [k], \sum j \in [i] \max(G(j) - B(j), 0) + \alpha \geq \theta_t \right\}, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

And similarly,

$$b_t = \begin{cases} \min \left\{ i \in [k], \sum j \in [i] \min(G(j), B(j)) \geq \theta_t \right\}, & \text{if } \theta_t \leq \alpha \\ \min \left\{ i \in [k], \sum j \in [i] \max(B(j) - G(j), 0) + \alpha \geq \theta_t \right\}, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For any $t \in \mathbb{Z}_+$, $g_t$ and $b_t$ satisfy the following properties.

- If $\theta_t \leq \alpha$, then $g_t = b_t$.
- If $\theta_t > \alpha$, then $b_t \in [k'] = P'$. This is because for any $i > k'$, $G(i) \geq B(i)$.

This immediately implies the desired claim. In fact, let $T$ be the smallest integer such that $\theta_T > \alpha$, so $g_t = b_t$ for any $t < T$.

There are two cases.

- $P'$ accepts $\{g_1, \ldots, g_{T-1}\} = \{b_1, \ldots, b_{T-1}\}$ (and maybe also some prefix of this sequence of outcomes). In such cases, $T(P', G) = T(P', B)$.
- Otherwise, we have $T(P', G) \geq T$. On the other hand, $b_t \in P'$, so $T(P', B) = T \leq T(P', G)$.

So in any case, we have

$$T(P', B) \leq T(P', G).$$

This concludes the proof.

**Proof of Theorem 3.** First we construct $(P', c)$. Let $P = \{(o^*)\}$ where $o^* \in O$ is an outcome such that $B(o^*)/G(o^*) = \min_{o \in O} B(o)/G(o)$. Note that whenever $G \neq B$, $B(o^*)/G(o^*) < 1$. Below we show that setting $c = B(o^*)$ gives the desired cost efficiency. First observe that

$$c \cdot E[T(P, B)] = c \cdot B(o^*) - 1 = B(o^*) \cdot B(o^*) - 1 = 1.$$ 

So by Lemma 2, bad agents never take tests. For good agents,

$$c \cdot E[T(P, G)] = B(o^*) \cdot G(o^*) - 1 < B(o^*) \cdot B(o^*) - 1 = 1.$$ 

So good agents always take tests, and pay expected cost $B(o^*)/G(o^*) < 1$.

Now consider any memoryless policy $P' = \{o\} \mid o \in P'$, where $P' \subseteq O$. We have

$$B(P')/G(P') \geq \min_{o \in O} B(o)/G(o).$$

Suppose $(P', c')$ is perfectly accurate. By Lemma 2, in order to make bad agents unwilling to take tests, we have

$$c' \geq B(P').$$

Then for good agents, the expected total cost can be bounded in the following way.

$$c' \cdot E[T(P', G)] \geq B(P')/G(P') \geq \min_{o \in O} B(o)/G(o),$$

which is the second half of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4. Without loss of generality, suppose for any \( i \in [k-1], G(i)/B(i) \geq G(i+1)/B(i+1). \) (If this assumption does not hold, we can reorder the outcome space by \( G(i)/B(i) \) and renumber the outcomes in the new order.) Note that since \( G \neq B, \) we must have \( G(1) > B(1) \) and \( G(k) < B(k), \) and as a result, for any \( \theta \in (0, k), \) \( G([0, \theta]) > B([0, \theta]) \). Consider the family of policies \( \mathcal{P}(\theta) \) parametrized by a threshold \( \theta \in O, \) defined as follows.

\[
\mathcal{P}(\theta) = \{ \{o\} \mid o \in [0, \theta]\}.
\]

Observe that for any \( \theta \in (0, k), \)

\[
\Pr_{o \sim G^*} \left[ \mathcal{P}(\theta) \text{ accepts } \{o\} \right] = G([0, \theta]) > B([0, \theta]) = \Pr_{o \sim B} \left[ \mathcal{P}(\theta) \text{ accepts } \{o\} \right].
\]

Since \( \mathcal{P}(\theta) \) is memoryless, this further implies that for any \( \theta \in (0, k), \)

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta), G)] = G([0, \theta])^{-1} < B([0, \theta])^{-1} = \mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta), B)].
\]

Our goal is to show that there exists some \( \theta \in (0, k), \) such that \( (\mathcal{P}(\theta), c) \) is perfectly accurate, which by Lemma 2 is equivalent to

\[
c \cdot \mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta), G)] < 1 \leq c \cdot \mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta), B)].
\]

Observe that

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta), B)] = B([0, \theta])^{-1}
\]

is continuous in \( \theta \) on \( O. \) Since \( B([0, 0])^{-1} = \infty \) and \( B([0, k])^{-1} = 1, \) there must be some \( \theta^* \in (0, k), \) such that

\[
B([0, \theta^*])^{-1} = c^{-1}.
\]

Moreover, the same \( \theta^* \) satisfies

\[
G([0, \theta^*])^{-1} < B([0, \theta^*])^{-1} = c^{-1}.
\]

As a result, \( \mathcal{P}(\theta^*) \) satisfies the desired conditions. This concludes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 5. The plan is to consider a family of policies parametrized by some threshold, each of which has the desired worst-case efficiency, and argue some policy in this family together with the cost per test \( c \) achieves perfect accuracy.

Let \( T = [1/c] + 1. \) Again, without loss of generality, suppose for any \( i \in [k-1], G(i)/B(i) \geq G(i+1)/B(i+1), \) and therefore for any \( \theta \in (0, k), \) we have \( G([0, \theta]) > B([0, \theta]) \). For \( \theta \in O, \) let

\[
\mathcal{P}(\theta) = \{ \{o\} \mid o \in [0, \theta]\} \cup \{ \{o_1, \ldots, o_T\} \mid \forall t \in [T], o_t \in O\}.
\]

That is, \( \mathcal{P}(\theta) \) accepts any set of outcomes which contains some outcome from \([0, \theta], \) or has cardinality at least \( T. \) Observe that

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta), B)] \text{ is continuous in } \theta. \text{ Moreover,}
\]

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(0), B)] = T > c^{-1} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(k), B)] = 1 < c^{-1}.
\]

So, there must be some \( \theta^* \in (0, k) \) such that

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta^*), B)] = c^{-1}.
\]

And since \( G([0, \theta^*]) > B([0, \theta^*]), \) for any \( t < T, \)

\[
\Pr[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta^*), G) \leq t] > \Pr[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta^*), B)].
\]

This is because \( T(\mathcal{P}(\theta^*), G) \) and \( T(\mathcal{P}(\theta^*), B) \) follow geometric distributions on \([1, \ldots, T-1], \) with parameters \( G([0, \theta^*]) \)

and \( B([0, \theta^*]), \) respectively. And as a result,

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta^*), G)] < \mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}(\theta^*), B)] = c^{-1}.
\]

By Lemma 2, \( (\mathcal{P}(\theta^*), c) \) is perfectly accurate.

Proof of Proposition 1. Without loss of generality assume the support of \( G \) is \( O = [0, k]. \) Suppose, towards a contradiction, that

\[
\Pr[T(\mathcal{P}, G) < [1/c] + 1] = 1.
\]

We show \( (\mathcal{P}, c) \) cannot be perfectly accurate.

Let \( T = [1/c] + 1. \) Consider the first \( T - 1 \) outcomes a good agent receives, \( (g_1, \ldots, g_{T-1}) \sim G^{T-1}. \) Note that the distribution of \( (g_1, \ldots, g_{T-1}), G^{T-1}, \) is piecewise constant over \( O^{T-1}, \) and its support is \( O^{T-1}. \) By our assumption, \( \mathcal{P} \) accepts \( (g_1, \ldots, g_{T-1}) \) with probability 1. As a result, \( \mathcal{P} \) must accept everything in \( O^{T-1}, \) potentially taking away a zero-measure set \( S \) (where the measure is \( G^{T-1}, \) i.e., \( G^{T-1}(S) = 0) \).

Now since \( B \) is piecewise constant over \( O, B^{T-1} \) is also piecewise constant over \( O^{T-1}. \) We then have \( B^{T-1}(S) = 0. \) As a result, \( \mathcal{P} \) accepts \( (b_1, \ldots, b_{T-1}) \sim B^{T-1} \) with probability 1. In other words, we have

\[
\Pr[T(\mathcal{P}, B) < T] = 1.
\]
One may check that

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}, B)] \leq \frac{1}{c} \cdot \Pr[T(\mathcal{P}, B) \leq \frac{1}{c}] \leq \frac{1}{c} \cdot \Pr[T(\mathcal{P}, B) < T] < \frac{1}{c}.
\]

When \(1/c = \frac{1}{c} = T - 1\), since

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}, G)] < \frac{1}{c} = T - 1,
\]

there must exist a multiset \(T \in \mathcal{P}\) where \(|T| \leq T - 2\). Then for bad agents, since \(G\) and \(B\) share the same support, we have \(B^{T-2}(T) > 0\), and therefore

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}, B)] \leq (T - 2) \cdot B^{T-2}(T) + (T - 1) \cdot (1 - B^{T-2}(T)) < T - 1 = 1/c.
\]

So in any case, we have

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}, B)] < 1/c.
\]

Lemma 2 then implies that bad agents have the incentive to take tests till acceptance, and \((\mathcal{P}, c)\) is not perfectly accurate, a contradiction.

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Below we construct \(G\) and \(B\). Let \(k = 2\), and \(G\) and \(B\) be such that \(G(1) = 0.4, G(2) = 0.6, \) and \(B(1) = B(2) = 0.5\). Observe that \(d_{TV}(G, B) = 0.1\). We argue that for any policy \(\mathcal{P}\), we always have

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}, B)] \leq 2\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}, G)].
\]

This directly implies the proposition, since if \((\mathcal{P}, c)\) is perfectly accurate, then by Lemma 2,

\[
\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}, G)] \geq \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}, B)] > \frac{1}{2} c^{-1} = \frac{1}{2c}.
\]

In order to bound \(\mathbb{E}[T(\mathcal{P}, B)]\), again we consider the sequences of outcomes a good agent and a bad agent get respectively, \(\{g_t\}_t\) and \(\{b_t\}_t\). We again couple \(\{g_t\}\) and \(\{b_t\}\) such that

\[
\Pr[T(\mathcal{P}, B) \leq T(\mathcal{P}, G)] = 1,
\]

which implies the desired bound. Let \(\{\theta_t\}_t\) be iid uniform numbers in \([0, 1]\). For any \(t \in \mathbb{Z}^+_+\), let \(b_t = 2\theta_t\). The construction of \(\{g_t\}_t\) is more involved. Each \(g_t\) is determined collectively by \(\theta_{2t-1}\) and \(\theta_{2t}\). For any \(t \in \mathbb{Z}^+_+\), let

\[
g_t = \begin{cases} 
\theta_{2t}/0.8, & \text{if } \theta_{2t-1} \leq 0.5 \text{ and } \theta_{2t} \leq 0.8 \\
1 + (\theta_{2t} - 0.8)/1.2, & \text{if } \theta_{2t-1} \leq 0.5 \text{ and } \theta_{2t} > 0.8 \\
1 + (\theta_{2t} + 0.2)/1.2, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

One may check that \(\{g_t\}\) are iid, and each \(g_t\) has distribution \(G\). More importantly, we always have

\[
g_t \in \{b_{2t-1}, b_{2t}\}.
\]

As a result, for any \(t \in \mathbb{Z}^+_+\) we always have

\[
\{g_1, \ldots, g_t\} \subseteq \{b_1, \ldots, b_{2t}\},
\]

as multisets. Therefore, whenever \(\mathcal{P}\) accepts \(\{g_1, \ldots, g_t\}\), it also accepts \(\{b_1, \ldots, b_{2t}\}\). This concludes the proof.