

# Introduction to Cryptography

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
# Summary

- **Symmetric Encryption**
- Public Encryption
- Digital Signature
- Key Distribution

# Basic Terminology

- **plaintext** - the original message
- **ciphertext** - the coded message
- **cipher** - algorithm for transforming plaintext to ciphertext
- **key** - info used in cipher known only to sender/receiver
- **encipher (encrypt)** - converting plaintext to ciphertext
- **decipher (decrypt)** - recovering ciphertext from plaintext
- **cryptography** - study of encryption principles/methods
- **cryptanalysis (codebreaking)** - the study of principles/methods of deciphering ciphertext *without* knowing key
- **cryptology** - the field of both cryptography and cryptanalysis

# The language of cryptography



**symmetric key** crypto: sender, receiver keys *identical*

**public-key** crypto: encryption key *public*, decryption key *secret* (private)

# Cryptography

- can characterize by:
  - type of encryption operations used
    - substitution / transposition / product
  - number of keys used
    - single-key or private / two-key or public
  - way in which plaintext is processed
    - block / stream


# More Definitions

- **unconditional security**
  - no matter how much computer power is available, the cipher cannot be broken since the ciphertext provides insufficient information to uniquely determine the corresponding plaintext
- **computational security**
  - given limited computing resources (eg time needed for calculations is greater than age of universe), the cipher cannot be broken

# Symmetric Encryption


- or conventional / secret-key / single-key
- sender and recipient share a common key
- all classical encryption algorithms are private-key
- was only type prior to invention of public-key in 1970's

# Symmetric Cipher Model





# Symmetric Key Cryptography



- symmetric key** crypto: Bob and Alice share know same (symmetric) key:  $K_{A-B}$
- e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher

# Requirements

- two requirements for secure use of symmetric encryption:
  - a strong encryption algorithm
  - a secret key known only to sender / receiver

$$Y = E_K(X)$$

$$X = D_K(Y)$$

- assume encryption algorithm is known
- implies a secure channel to distribute key

# Simple Idea: One-Time Pad



Key is a never-repeating bit sequence as long as plaintext

Encrypt by bitwise XOR of plaintext and key:  
 $\text{ciphertext} = \text{plaintext} \oplus \text{key}$

Decrypt by bitwise XOR of ciphertext and key:  
 $\text{ciphertext} \oplus \text{key} =$   
 $(\text{plaintext} \oplus \text{key}) \oplus \text{key} =$   
 $\text{plaintext} \oplus (\text{key} \oplus \text{key}) =$   
 $\text{plaintext}$

Cipher achieves **perfect secrecy** if and only if there are as many possible keys as possible plaintexts, and every key is equally likely (Claude Shannon's result)

# Advantages of One-Time Pad

- Easy to compute
  - Encryption and decryption are the same operation
  - Bitwise XOR is very cheap to compute
- As secure as possible
  - Given a ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally likely, regardless of attacker's computational resources
  - ...as long as the key sequence is truly random
    - True randomness is expensive to obtain in large quantities
  - ...as long as each key is same length as plaintext
    - But how does the sender communicate the key to receiver?

# Problems with One-Time Pad

- Key must be as long as plaintext
  - Impractical in most realistic scenarios
  - Still used for diplomatic and intelligence traffic
- Does not guarantee integrity
  - One-time pad only guarantees confidentiality
  - Attacker cannot recover plaintext, but can easily change it to something else
- Insecure if keys are reused
  - Attacker can obtain XOR of plaintexts

# Summary

- Symmetric encryption
- **Public encryption**
- Digital Signature
- Key distribution

# Private-Key Cryptography

- traditional **private/secret/single key** cryptography uses **one** key
- shared by both sender and receiver
- if this key is disclosed communications are compromised
- also is **symmetric**, parties are equal
- hence does not protect sender from receiver forging a message & claiming is sent by sender

# Public-Key Cryptography


- probably most significant advance in the 3000 year history of cryptography
- uses **two** keys – a public & a private key
- **asymmetric** since parties are **not** equal
- uses clever application of number theoretic concepts to function
- complements **rather than** replaces private key crypto



# Public-Key Cryptography

- **public-key/two-key/asymmetric** cryptography involves the use of **two** keys:
  - a **public-key**, which may be known by anybody, and can be used to **encrypt messages**, and **verify signatures**
  - a **private-key**, known only to the recipient, used to **decrypt messages**, and **sign** (create) **signatures**
- is **asymmetric** because
  - those who encrypt messages or verify signatures **cannot** decrypt messages or create signatures

# Public-Key Cryptography



# Public-Key Characteristics

- Public-Key algorithms rely on two keys with the characteristics that it is:
  - computationally infeasible to find decryption key knowing only algorithm & encryption key
  - computationally easy to en/decrypt messages when the relevant (en/decrypt) key is known
  - either of the two related keys can be used for encryption, with the other used for decryption (in some schemes)

# Public-Key Cryptosystems




Figure 9.4 Public-Key Cryptosystem: Secrecy and Authentication

# Public-Key Applications

- can classify uses into 3 categories:
  - **encryption/decryption** (provide secrecy)
  - **digital signatures** (provide authentication)
  - **key exchange** (of session keys)
- some algorithms are suitable for all uses, others are specific to one

# Security of Public Key Schemes

- like private key schemes brute force **exhaustive search** attack is always theoretically possible
- but keys used are too large (>512bits)
- security relies on a **large enough** difference in difficulty between **easy** (en/decrypt) and **hard** (cryptanalysis) problems
- more generally the **hard** problem is known, its just made too hard to do in practise
- requires the use of **very large numbers**
- hence is **slow** compared to secret key schemes

# Public key encryption algorithms

Requirements:

① need  $K_B^+(\cdot)$  and  $K_B^-(\cdot)$  such that

$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m$$

② given public key  $K_B^+$ , it should be impossible to compute private key  $K_B^-$

**RSA:** Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

# RSA: Choosing keys

1. Choose two large prime numbers  $p, q$ .  
(e.g., 1024 bits each)
2. Compute  $n = pq$ ,  $z = (p-1)(q-1)$
3. Choose  $e$  (with  $e < n$ ) that has no common factors with  $z$ . ( $e, z$  are "relatively prime").
4. Choose  $d$  such that  $ed-1$  is exactly divisible by  $z$ .  
(in other words:  $ed \bmod z = 1$ ).
5. Public key is  $(n, e)$ . Private key is  $(n, d)$ .  
 $\underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_{K_B^+}$                        $\underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_{K_B^-}$



# RSA: Encryption, decryption

0. Given  $(n, e)$  and  $(n, d)$  as computed above
1. To encrypt bit pattern,  $m$ , compute  
 $c = m^e \bmod n$  (i.e., remainder when  $m^e$  is divided by  $n$ )
2. To decrypt received bit pattern,  $c$ , compute  
 $m = c^d \bmod n$  (i.e., remainder when  $c^d$  is divided by  $n$ )

Magic happens!

$$m = \underbrace{(m^e \bmod n)}_c^d \bmod n$$

## RSA example:

Bob chooses  $p=5$ ,  $q=7$ . Then  $n=35$ ,  $z=24$ .

$e=5$  (so  $e$ ,  $z$  relatively prime).

$d=29$  (so  $ed-1$  exactly divisible by  $z$ ).

encrypt:	<u>letter</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>m<sup>e</sup></u>	<u>c = m<sup>e</sup> mod n</u>
	I	12	1524832	17
decrypt:	<u>c</u>	<u>c<sup>d</sup></u>	<u>m = c<sup>d</sup> mod n</u>	<u>letter</u>
	17	481968572106750915091411825223071697	12	I

RSA: Why is that  $m = (m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n$

Useful number theory result: If  $p, q$  prime and  $n = pq$ , then:  
 $x^y \bmod n = x^{y \bmod (p-1)(q-1)} \bmod n$

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$$\begin{aligned} (m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n &= m^{ed} \bmod n \\ &= m^{ed \bmod (p-1)(q-1)} \bmod n \\ &\quad \text{(using number theory result above)} \\ &= m^1 \bmod n \\ &\quad \text{(since we chose } ed \text{ to be divisible by} \\ &\quad \text{(} p-1)(q-1 \text{) with remainder 1 )} \\ &= m \end{aligned}$$

RSA: another important property

The following property will be *very* useful later:

$$\underbrace{K_B^-(K_B^+(m))}_{\text{use public key first, followed by private key}} = m = \underbrace{K_B^+(K_B^-(m))}_{\text{use private key first, followed by public key}}$$

use public key  
first, followed  
by private key

use private key  
first, followed  
by public key

*Result is the same!*

# Summary

- Symmetric encryption
- Public encryption
- **Digital Signature**
- Key distribution

# Digital Signatures

Cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written signatures.

- sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator.
- **verifiable, nonforgeable**: recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document


# Digital Signatures


## Simple digital signature for message $m$ :

- Bob signs  $m$  by encrypting with his private key  $K_B$ , creating “signed” message,  $K_B(m)$

Bob's message,  $m$

Dear Alice  
Oh, how I have missed you. I think of you all the time! ... (blah blah blah)  
Bob

  $K_B^-$  Bob's private key



$K_B^-(m)$

Bob's message,  $m$ , signed (encrypted) with his private key

## Digital Signatures (more)

- Suppose Alice receives msg  $m$ , digital signature  $K_B^-(m)$
- Alice verifies  $m$  signed by Bob by applying Bob's public key  $K_B^+$  to  $K_B^-(m)$  then checks  $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$ .
- If  $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$ , whoever signed  $m$  must have used Bob's private key.

### Alice thus verifies that:

- ✓ Bob signed  $m$ .
- ✓ No one else signed  $m$ .
- ✓ Bob signed  $m$  and not  $m'$ .

### Non-repudiation:

- ✓ Alice can take  $m$ , and signature  $K_B^-(m)$  to court and prove that Bob signed  $m$ .



Internet checksum: poor crypto hash function

Internet checksum has some properties of hash function:

- ✓ produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of message
- ✓ is many-to-one

But given message with given hash value, it is easy to find another message with same hash value:

<u>message</u>	<u>ASCII format</u>	<u>message</u>	<u>ASCII format</u>
I O U 1	49 4F 55 31	I O U <u>9</u>	49 4F 55 <u>39</u>
0 0 . 9	30 30 2E 39	0 0 . <u>1</u>	30 30 2E <u>31</u>
9 B O B	39 42 D2 42	9 B O B	39 42 D2 42
	<u>B2 C1 D2 AC</u>		<u>B2 C1 D2 AC</u>


different messages  
but identical checksums!

# Message Digests

Computationally expensive to public-key-encrypt long messages

Goal: fixed-length, easy-to-compute digital “fingerprint”

- apply hash function  $H$  to  $m$ , get fixed size message digest,  $H(m)$ .




## Hash function properties:

- many-to-1
- produces fixed-size msg digest (fingerprint)
- given message digest  $x$ , computationally infeasible to find  $m$  such that  $x = H(m)$

# Digital signature = signed message digest

Bob sends digitally signed message:



Alice verifies signature and integrity of digitally signed message:

